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ABSTRACT
In this thesis I probe the question of whether Muslims and Christians worship the same
God primarily through the discipline of philosophy of language. Though a multifaceted
question at its core (e.g., theological, historical), the question directly ties into how
language operates in relation to God. That is, the ways in which Muslims and Christians
make predications of God have a significant role in delineating whether they worship the
same God. By working from the perspective of predication, I argue that Muslims and
Christians refer to but do not worship the same God. In this sense, Muslims and
Christians refer to the same God with the use of generic predicates (e.g., God is good);
however, they do not worship same God given that worship entails the use of specific
predicates (e.g., God is Triune). Muslims and Christians thus meet the criteria for
common reference but cannot be regarded as maintaining the same referent in their
worship.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCION
Research Question
Do Muslims and Christians worship the same God? One way to pursue this
question is through the discipline of philosophy.1 For example, philosophy of language
clarifies what is entailed in predication and, as a result, may contribute to its theological
application in worship. Because worship entails linguistic elements (e.g., an informative
function) that necessitate theological predication, it is important to understand how
predicates function as they relate to the question at hand. In this respect, predication plays
a fundamental role when deciding whether Muslims and Christians worship the same
God.
Toward an Account of Reference and Predication
In An Interpretation of Religion, John Hick reflects on the plurality of religious
experience2 and its reliability to orient people toward contemplation of God.3 He argues
that various religious experiences arise because God is universally presupposed and thus

1. It should be noted this question cannot be reduced to areas of philosophical inquiry alone,
which includes several subdisciplines (e.g., philosophy of mind, philosophy of religion, epistemology).
Instead, embedded in the question are also theological, historical, and linguistic aspects that necessarily
facilitate any decision of whether Muslims and Christians worship the same God. That is, these areas of
research would need to be addressed to offer systematic account of the issue at hand.
2. See John Hick, God Has Many Names (Philadelphia: Westminster, 1980).
3. John Hick, An Interpretation of Religion: Human Responses to the Divine (New Haven: Yale
University Press, 2005). See also John Hick, “Religious Pluralism and Salvation” in The Philosophical
Challenge of Religious Diversity, ed. Philip L. Quinn and Kevin Meeker (New York: Oxford University
Press, 2000), 54–66.
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God receives different predicates (e.g., Shiva, Trinity, Allah) depending on the religious
tradition. Hick’s hypothesis maintains that (1) God’s essence is unknowable and (2)
humans are only capable of basic predications of God grounded in their religious
experiences in the phenomenal world. In this respect, God is presupposed to exist through
religious experiences and only varies in predication insofar as these experiences are
influenced by one’s religious tradition that is contrived in a particular environment and
culture (e.g., beliefs, liturgical rites). In other words, theological predicates are
grammatical, rather than referential, concepts that are determined by religious experience;
such experiences are exclusively phenomenological.4 This creates an ontological gulf
between God and humanity that makes theological predicates, whether from a cataphatic
or apophatic perspective, irrelevant for assessing the normative value of religious
experience. The result of this dissimilarity between God and humanity makes any
decision on the question at hand unwarranted, given that theological predicates are
grounded in phenomenology.
In his essay, “Christians, Muslims, and the Name of God,” Denys Turner
questions the ontological gulf created in Hick’s hypothesis based on apophatic theology.
If theological predicates are irrelevant even from an apophatic perspective, Turner argues
this creates “an equivocal dividedness” in which God becomes utterly imperceptible. In
situations where God is utterly imperceptible, there is no basis from which to conclude

4. Hick is clear on this point. Religious experiences are analogous across major religious lines.
They differ, however, only because the phenomenology of these experiences are adapted based on religious
tradition. To clarify this point, take the following example: Two people looking at the same abstract
painting have the same experience perceiving the painting. However, the painting will be interpreted
differently by the two individuals based on the environmental and cultural factors influencing their
phenomenal experience.
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whether Muslims and Christians worship the same God.5 That is, if humans are unable to
approach God via negativa, then there is no positive content to base a normative analysis
on the question at hand.
Turner tries to resolve this problem by deeming predicates useful insofar as they
illuminate that God lacks spatial, temporal, and metaphysical parts (i.e., divine
simplicity). In this way, predicates contain positive content insofar as they illustrate that
God is beyond spatial, temporal, and metaphysical composition, which separates God
from finite concepts. For example, Turner maintains that the Islamic predicate of Tawhid
(i.e., oneness or unification) and the Christian predicate of God as Triune are useful
because they illuminate that there is “no plurality of gods and no plurality in God.”6
Therefore Turner’s line of argumentation is that the predicates of Tawhid and the Trinity
have positive content because they illuminate that God is beyond human categorization.
Turner thus concludes that Tawhid and the Trinity are not divergent theological
claims since they highlight God’s simplicity that transcends the complexities of created
composition. Given that Islam and Christianity maintain God’s utter transcendence,
embedded in the predicates of Tawhid and the Trinity are analogous theological
perspectives and therefore do not contradict each other from a numerical standpoint (i.e.,
God as exclusively one or God as Triune). In this way, Turner justifies that Muslims and

5. This and other critiques of Hick’s hypothesis can be found in Sumner B. Twiss, “The
Philosophy of Religious Pluralism: A Critical Appraisal of Hick and His Critics,” in The Philosophical
Challenge of Religious Diversity, ed. Philip L. Quinn and Kevin Meeker (New York: Oxford University
Press, 2000), 67–98.
6. Denys Turner, “Christians, Muslims, and the Name of God: Who Owns It, and How Would We
Know?” in Do we Worship the Same God? ed. by Miroslav Volf (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2012), 35.

3

Christians worship the same God because they rely on an apophatic qualifier.7 Thus the
essence of Turner’s argument is that if Muslims and Christians maintain that God is not
made of spatial, temporal, or metaphysical parts, then they must worship the same God.
In this sense, Turner tries to dial back the ontological gulf created in Hick’s
hypothesis between God and humanity by relying on apophatic theology. However, an
appeal to apophatic theology seems to forfeit the normative value of his argument since
predication via negativa is metaphysically thin. That is, it is not particularly clear what
Muslims and Christians agree on if there is little correspondence between God and
humanity from which to assess the question at hand.8
Miroslav Volf takes up a more cataphatic approach in Allah: A Christian
Response. Volf introduces what he terms sufficient similarity with regards to whether
Muslims and Christians worship the same God. Moving away from an apophatic extreme,
sufficient similarity compares predicates of God and determines whether these “thoughts
and utterances” refer to the same God. For Volf, to the extent that Muslims and
Christians maintain that God is one, creator, good, love, and entirely different from
creation, “it follows that” both traditions necessarily refer to the same God irrespective of
doctrines such as Tawhid and the Trinity.9 Though the idea of sufficient similarity is

7. It should be noted that Turner thinks the apophatic qualifier demonstrates only a necessary
(though not sufficient) condition that Muslims and Christians worship the same God. Because he argues
from an apophatic perspective, his argument can never be conclusive on whether Muslims and Christians
worship the same God.
8. For a similar argument, see Reza Shah-Kazemi, “Do Muslims and Christians Believe in the
Same God?” in Do we Worship the Same God? ed. Miroslav Volf (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2012), 76–
147.
9. Miroslav Volf, Allah: A Christian Response, 110, 145.
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never robustly developed in Allah, Volf argues that Islamic and Christian predicates
satisfy such sufficiency.
He argues that Muslims and Christians not only refer to but subsequently worship
the same God. Given that Muslims and Christians predicate similar (and at times
identical) characteristics of God, their ability to refer to the same God entails that they
worship the same God. Referring and worshiping are almost, if not entirely, synonymous
terms.10 As he says, “When Christians and Muslims agree on the [five predications
above], then in their worship of God they refer to the same object” (original emphasis).11
In this way, Muslims and Christians worship the same God provided that their predicates
of God are sufficiently similar. The argument here is similar to Turner’s, though from a
cataphatic perspective, in that theological predicates are the basis for assessing that
Muslims and Christians worship the same God.
In his book Is the Father of Jesus the God of Muhammad?, Timothy George takes
up Hick’s account and anticipates the latter two accounts.12 With respect to the question,
George argues both “yes and no.” On the one hand, George affirms that Muslims and
Christians share a set of fundamental predicates such as “oneness, eternity, power” and so
10. It should be noted that Volf is not clear on the relationship between reference and worship. In
fact, one cannot deduce whether predicates alone are enough for concluding that Muslims and Christians
worship the same God. Though he seemingly makes that point in chapter 5, to be fair to Volf, he spends an
entire chapter linking common practice (i.e., love of God and neighbor) as a sign that Muslims and
Christians worship the same God. Therefore, it seems Volf is making two general arguments for why
Muslims and Christians worship the same God: they share (1) a set of predicates of God and (2) common
practices. That said, it seems to me that Volf thinks common predicates of God alone are enough for
concluding that Muslims and Christians worship the same God, based on what is said in chapter 5. For
specifics on this point, see Volf, Allah: A Christian Response, 95–124.
11. Volf, Allah: A Christian Response, 110.
12. Timothy George, Is the Father of Jesus the God of Muhammad? (Grand Rapids: Zondervan,
2002). It should be noted that Timothy George wrote this book in 2002 prior to both Denys Turner’s essay
(2012) and Miroslav Volf’s book (2011). Though his book is a critique of neither Turner nor Volf, he poses
some serious problems for both of their projects.
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forth. These and other predicates are affirmed by both traditions and represent a common
entity in their speech acts. On the other hand, George argues that Trinity is an irreducible
predicate that unavoidably conflicts with the predicate of Tawhid. Because it is
irreducible in the life of God, Christianity “stands or falls” with the Trinity. Exclude the
Trinity and Christianity’s fundamental doctrine—the Incarnation—is compromised. In
this light, he argues that Tawhid and the Trinity are numerically and theologically
divergent and cannot be easily resolved by an apophatic qualifier. Given the irreducible
nature of Tawhid and the Trinity, George couples his earlier “yes” with an emphatic “no.”
Thus he concludes that the Father of Jesus is not the God of Muhammad because the
Trinity is irreducible in the life of God.13
George makes a distinction between predicates shared by two (or more) religious
traditions and predicates irreducible of a given religious tradition.14 For example, he
clearly agrees with Turner and others that Muslims and Christians refer to the same God
provided that they affirm a set of predicates. However, these predicates do not undermine
or diminish predicates such as Tawhid and the Trinity. Thus his argument is that
affirmation of a common entity of reference does not always have to invalidate predicates
that are particular among a community. Instead one can affirm predicates that are

13. For a similar argument, see Kenneth Cragg, Muhammad and the Christian (Oxford: Oneworld,
1984).
14. Though it is unclear exactly what George means by irreducible, I take him to mean that
Christianity is upheld almost exclusively on divine revelation in the Incarnation. If the Trinity is removed,
then the fundamental basis of Christianity is omitted. According to this construal, the Trinity is not an
irreducible attribute in the life of God. That would be irrational and unjustifiable. Instead the Trinity (and
subsequently Tawhid) are irreducible conceptions of God that demonstrate the particularities of each
tradition.
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common across religious lines and still maintain theological positions that are irreducible
in one’s own tradition.
More in agreement with George than the others, my claim is that Muslims and
Christians do not worship the same God. I plan to establish that Muslims and Christians
refer to the same God with the use of a proper name; however, the referential use of a
proper name does not entail that Muslims and Christians worship the same God. Taking
into consideration recent work in philosophy of language and the previous expositions,
we must make two major distinctions with respect to the question: (a1) The ability for two
(or more) people to refer to the same entity is not contingent upon an agreement over a
detailed and exhaustive list of predicates. Rather, an entity can be cooperatively
referenced by the use of a proper name provided that (i) both parties have a common
causal-historical account (name-calling practice) and (ii) they share a set of predicates.15
(a2) In light of (i) and clarification on (ii), both groups are able to refer to a given entity
with the use of a proper name provided that the name connotes a similar set of generic
predicates for both groups.16 That is, a proper name does not need to elucidate specific
predicates to establish the referent. Given (a1) and (a2), I distinguish between reference by
generic predication and worship by specific predication.
(b) Provided that worship is multifaceted (e.g., words, movements, symbols),
liturgy is the most robust expression of worship, given that it interweaves several
elements into a collective whole. In this sense, liturgical rites constitute thick forms of

15. See Keith Donnellan, “Reference and Definite Descriptions” in Philosophy of Language, ed.
A. P. Martinich (New York: Oxford University Press, 2006), 265–77; Saul Kripke, Naming and Necessity
(Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1980); Gareth Evans, “The Causal Theory of Names” in The Philosophy of
Language, ed. A. P. Martinich (New York: Oxford University Press, 2006), 314–25.
16. John R. Searle, “Proper Names,” Mind 67.267 (1958): 166–73.
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worship insofar as they incorporate concrete and particular words, movements, and
symbols. Therefore, I restrict my project exclusively to liturgical rites and do not wade
into minute (or thin) forms of worship.
Note that distinctions (a) and (b) converge and diverge with the previous
expositions. For instance, my response runs contrary to Hick’s hypothesis provided that
my project maintains that reference and predication correspond (whether directly or
indirectly) to an ontological reality (i.e., God). Furthermore, my argument goes contrary
to Turner’s and Volf’s because they conflate philosophical terms such as predication,
reference, and worship. Though their expositions are more balanced than Hick’s, there
remains room for improvement with regard to what is entailed in predication, reference,
and worship. And lastly, my response converges with George’s exposition, given that he
makes an intuitive distinction between two types of predication. Though his argument is
not primarily a philosophical analysis, his intuition to distinguish between predicates that
are irreducible and ones that are not is the closest exposition to my own.
Methodology
My thesis employs insights from analytic philosophy and systematic theology. In
relation to analytic philosophy, I draw from recent work in philosophy of language (i.e.,
Saul Kripke, John Searle, Keith Donnellan, Gareth Evans, and E. J. Lowe). In particular,
I seek to establish the functions of reference and predication as they relate to a divine
reality. Once these are established, I evaluate whether Muslims and Christians worship
the same God, considering that reference and predication are embedded in the question.
As for systematic theology, my thesis focuses on the loci of ecclesiology, Christology,
and most importantly theology proper. I use systematic theology in these particular areas
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to inform my perspective on how Muslims and Christians speak of God. In the end, my
thesis is primarily regulated by philosophy interspersed with theological elements. In a
technical sense, my methodology tracks as philosophical theology.
Structure of the Thesis
In this chapter I have clarified the question that guides the structure and scope of
this thesis. I have also included a brief account of the scholarly discussion of the
question. In the second chapter I will make a basic distinction between reference and
predication and clarify their particular functions. Accordingly, the chapter will also make
a distinction between generic and specific predication. By building on these distinctions,
the third chapter will develop an account of reference as it relates to the question. This
account will primarily show that Muslims and Christians refer to but do not worship the
same God. In the concluding chapter, I will sum up my overall argument while
mentioning how this project does not necessitate intolerance and violence.
Contributions to Scholarship
My aim for this thesis is modest since philosophy is but one of several relevant
areas of research (e.g., theology, history) that contributes to whether Muslims and
Christians worship the same God. Even so, this thesis makes two important contributions.
The first contribution is that my thesis cleans up some technical language associated with
the question. It has become apparent in the research that there is misunderstanding on
what exactly is entailed in reference and predication as they relate to God. To mitigate
such misunderstanding, this thesis seeks to create space for analytic philosophy to inform
and clarify what is entailed in the question. That is, I hope my thesis contributes to
scholarship insofar as it develops a more ideal language for answering the question.
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The second and more important contribution is that my thesis develops a response
to whether Muslims and Christians worship the same God. Though this has been done
countless times in the research, my thesis tries to develop an argument influenced by
analytic philosophy. By building on the current research with analytic philosophy, I hope
to make an original contribution by arguing that Muslims and Christians refer to but do
not worship the same God.
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CHAPTER II
THE ENTAILMENTS OF REFERENCE AND PREDICATON
Introduction
The primary aim of this chapter is to clarify what is entailed in reference and
predication as they relate to God. Since this thesis seeks to answer whether Muslims and
Christians worship the same God from a philosophical perspective, clarifying the ways in
which language and its various parts function is of utmost importance. Of those parts,
reference and predication are most significant, given that an answer to the question must
track with the philosophical parameters of how to speak of God. Thus this chapter tries to
identify the exactitudes of reference and predication since they are essential for
answering whether Muslims and Christians worship the same God.
There is also increasing need to identify the exactitudes of reference and
predication, given that the wider research on the topic has inadequately assumed what
they entail. For example, Tomas Bogardus and Mallorie Urban introduce a philosophical
roadmap for how to decide whether Muslims and Christians worship the same God.1
They maintain that a decision on this matter has everything to do with what determines
the reference of a proper name (e.g., God, Nikola Jokic). More specifically, they argue
that the way proper names acquire their referents influences how we decide if Muslims
and Christians worship the same God. Bogardus and Urban in this way pinpoint the

1. Tomas Bogardus and Malorie Urban, “How to Tell Whether Christians and Muslims Worship
the Same God,” Faith and Philosophy 34.2 (2017): 176–200.
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major issues regarding reference when it comes to whether Muslims and Christians
worship the same God. However, they neither define nor describe the function of
reference, which makes their use of reference liable to misappropriation.
In a similar way, there are some like George, Volf, and Turner who look beyond
reference and argue that predication plays a fundamental role in deciding whether
Muslims and Christians worship the same God.2 They argue the characteristics (e.g.,
attributes, modes) in which Muslims and Christians predicate of God determines whether
they worship the same God. As such, inquiry into whether Muslims and Christians
worship the same God depends on whether their conceptions of God are compatible.
However, much in the same way as Bogardus and Urban, these scholars do not describe
what is entailed in predication. The consequence is that ill-defined terms (i.e., reference
and predication) lead to misguided decisions on whether Muslims and Christians worship
the same God.
Therefore I clarify the functions of reference and predication to mend these
inconsistencies in the research. This explication will demonstrate that reference and
predication are distinct linguistic and cognitional functions that generate radically
different outcomes that, if conflated, detract from the pragmatism of using philosophy of
language to answer the question at hand. Therefore by clarifying what is entailed in
reference and predication, this chapter is a preliminary step for assessing whether
Muslims and Christians worship the same God.

2. Turner, “Christians, Muslims, and the Name of God”; Volf, Allah: A Christian Response;
George, Is the Father of Jesus the God of Muhammad.
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By drawing upon Lowe and Evans and their depictions of reference and
predication, I determine that reference primarily tracks, picks out, and states and acquires
information about entities while predication elucidates entities by their ontological
character. By determining the functions of reference and predication, I am able to make
two distinctions that aid my decision of whether Muslims and Christians worship the
same God. First, though reference and predication help create meaningful statements out
physical and theoretical realities, they are unique and independent functions that cannot
be conflated.
Second, predication should be consigned into two distinct but related categories.
The first category I call generic predication. Generic predication is understood as a
linguistic or cognitional function that alludes to entities in a vague sense. The second
category is what I call specific predication. Like generic predication, specific predication
is a linguistic or cognitional function. However, instead of alluding to entities in a vague
sense, specific predicates do so in an irreducible and unique sense. Thus by consigning
predication into two distinct yet related categories, I seek to develop a more ideal use of
predication.
Clarifying Reference
Reference, classically conceived, holds between a linguistic or cognitional
element on the one hand and a physical or theoretical reality on the other hand.3 By
pairing or linking a word or thought with an entity, referential relations allow for
particular entities to be tracked, picked out, and have information stated or acquired about

3. Michael Devitt, “Reference,” Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy 8:153–64, and Timothy
Williamson, “Reference,” Encyclopedia of Philosophy 8:290–95.
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them. For example, when Nikola Jokic is asserted, the proper name (i.e., the linguistic or
cognitional element) refers to a particular individual that plays professional basketball
and not to some other individual. As such, referential relations rule out entities so that the
appropriate entity can be properly referenced. Though reference is generally more
complex than the previous example illustrates, the basic components of referential
relations hold between a linguistic or cognitional element and an entity.
The underlining intent of referential relations is to create meaningful statements
or concepts by tracking, picking out, and stating or acquiring information about entities.
By pairing or linking a word or thought with an entity, reality is logically configured in
such a way that generates meaningful statements or concepts. For this reason, referential
relations are considered the core of linguistic and cognitional meaning.4 Given its
particular function, referential relations generate meaningful statements or concepts
insofar as the word or thought remains properly paired or linked to the entity. For
instance, “Nikola Jokic is a Serbian basketball player” is a meaningful statement only to
the extent that the proper name remains paired or linked to the individual associated with
“is a Serbian basketball player.” For any reason the referential relation fails and the
proper name is not linked or paired to the entity, the statement “Nikola Jokic is a Serbian
basketball player” becomes meaningless. This function is characterized in the following
deductive terms:

‘x is y’ is meaningful if and only if the entity referred to by x is entity y.

4. Devitt, “Reference,” 8:153–64.
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Eliminate this relation between the linguistic or cognitional element, and the entity and
the statement or concept becomes meaningless. The contours of reference thus hold
between a linguistic or cognitional element and an entity with the function of tracking,
picking out, stating or acquiring information about a particular entity.5
To ensure clarity of thought, I take it that the ability to track or pick out an entity
is intuitive with respect to referential relations; however, it is not clear what kind of
information is stated or acquired during referential relations. Moreover, it is not clear
what within a referential relation generates information. In other words, when a word or
thought is paired or linked to an entity, what about that relationship is informative and
how does it happen?
In its most basic form, information is generated when a word or thought is paired
or linked with an entity, though the caveat is that the relationship between a word or
thought and the entity does not always elucidate information. The only time when
referential relations are informative is when reference is fixed by description.6 Reference
by description takes place when a word or a thought contains descriptive content and is
paired or linked to an entity. This elucidates information about the entity given that the
word or thought (when properly paired or linked) is associated with descriptive content
about the entity. A different way of explaining this dynamic is to say that words and
thoughts contain sense. On this construal, names and thoughts often contain sensible
content that when properly paired or linked with an entity, the name or thought elucidates

5. It should be noted that these examples are not the only way to refer to entities. These examples
feature what is commonly called the referential theory of proper names. Though this theory demonstrates
the basic structure of referential relations, there are several other theories of reference. These cannot be
explained in the immediate context, but they will be touched upon in chapter 3.
6. Gareth Evans, “Reference and Contingency,” The Monist 62.2 (1979): 161–89.
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the descriptive content and thus generates information. Explained as either accentuating
descriptive content or sense, when a word or thought is paired or linked to an entity, the
likely result is that information is generated.
For example, take my association with Nikola Jokic. Upon use of Nikola Jokic, it
is more plausible the proper name will invoke “the basketball player from Serbia” rather
than some other entity.7 This is because my association with Nikola Jokic is tied to the
individual that satisfies the description “the basketball player from Serbia.”8 In other
words, the only (or more dominant) association with Nikola Jokic is the entity that
satisfies “the basketball player from Serbia.” My association thus accentuates information
about the entity denoted by Nikola Jokic because the proper name is connected to
descriptive content or sense.9
Clarifying Predication
Unlike reference, predication neither tracks, picks out, nor states or acquires
information about entities. Rather predication is a relation between two (or more) entities
(e.g., objects, individuals, attributes, modes) that, in light of their relationship, clarify the
kind of ‘thing’ each of these entities is. Predication occurs when either one entity is said
of or inheres in another entity with the intent to categorize these entities into a categorial

7. Evans, “Reference and Contingency,” 161–67.
8. An interesting exception to this referential relation is if an individual does not have access to the
only (or dominant) association with the entity. Though I cannot say much about this exception, it is helpful
to note that the entity intending to be referenced will be unidentifiable until other association are added to
the entity’s dossier in a way that properly elucidates the entity
9. Proper names are not the only linguistic or cognitional elements that are informative with
regards to reference. Descriptions can also be informational within the contours of reference. Simply by
pairing or linking a description (the linguistic or cognitional element) with an entity accentuates
information much like proper names can do.
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(an a priori) structure of reality.10 As a basic example, take the previous statement,
“Nikola Jokic is a Serbian basketball player.” In this example, the individual denoted by
Nikola Jokic represents the linguistic or cognitional element while “a Serbian basketball
player” represents the predicate. From an ontological perspective, Nikola Jokic represents
a substance since humans are traditionally categorized as a species while “a Serbian
basketball player” is a property because it represents an attribute of being. Therefore, as a
result of its relational quality (i.e., entity is predicate), predication helps ontologically
categorize entities by their respective kinds. Understood as a relation between two (or
more) independent entities, predication helps locate entities by ontological category.
Though predicates neither track, pick out, nor state or acquire information about
entities, they help referential relations accomplish this function. Given that predication
primarily accentuates the ontological category of entities, when done properly, it helps
pair and link words or thoughts with entities. For example, in the statement “Nikola Jokic
is a Serbian basketball player,” the predicate clarifies the individual denoted by the
proper name and the cluster information associated with that individual. In a sense,
predicates aid referential relations because they clarify which entity a linguistic or
cognitional element is referencing. The outcome of elucidating the ontological character
of entities makes it more viable to track, pick out, and state or acquire information about
entities such as Nikola Jokic. Therefore predicates aid referential relations because they
clarify entities by ontological category (e.g., type, genus, attribute, mode).

10. A categorial structure of reality simply divides reality into essential ontological categories and
comments on their relationships between them.
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In other words, predicates individuate entities and, as a result, entities are more
readily referenced.11 For example, take the previous statement “Nikola Jokic is a Serbian
basketball player.” As said already, upon use of Nikola Jokic, the proper name intends to
refer to a particular individual. Yet simply asserting Nikola Jokic does not always mean
that the individual denoted by the proper name has been referenced. There are, of course,
ways that reference can be interrupted or redirected.12 One way to increase the
possibilities that reference is not interrupted or redirected is to clarify the ontological
character of the individual denoted by Nikola Jokic. By clarifying the ontological
character of Nikola Jokic, there is a greater likelihood that the correct individual is
referenced.
To illustrate this inference, say a colleague and I are attending a basketball game
with the intent to watch Nikola Jokic. To my colleague’s dismay, she is unfamiliar with
the National Basketball Association (NBA) and has little clue as to who we have come to
watch. From this point on, most statements that I make about Nikola Jokic lack meaning
for my colleague given that she is unfamiliar with which individual is being referenced.
Even a statement such as “Nikola Jokic is a Serbian basketball player” is void of meaning
for my colleague because it lacks reference to a particular individual.13 Every statement

11. Evans, “Reference and Contingency,” 162–66.
12. Though there are several ways reference can be interrupted or redirected, I will explain two in
order to illustrate this point. (1) Reference can be interrupted simply in the case where two entities share the
same word (e.g., name) or thought (e.g., idea). For example, there could be two individuals with the same
name Nikola Jokic. In cases such as this, there is no way to know, outside of acquiring more information
about the individuals, what individual is being referenced when the name Nikola Jokic is used. (2)
Reference can also be interrupted or redirected in virtue of the fact that the entity is unknown. For instance,
if the proper name Nikola Jokic is asserted and I do not know anyone (or anything) with that name,
reference will be interrupted or redirected.
13. Furthermore, it could also be the case that my colleague is unfamiliar with the NBA, thus this
too would lack meaning for her.
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in this sense that does not clarify the ontological character of Nikola Jokic lacks meaning
for my colleague.
So to draw attention to Nikola Jokic, I would need to first determine his
ontological character. This, of course, could be done by predicating various
characteristics held true about him (e.g., jersey number, height). In terms of deductive
logic, predicates operate in the following way:

predicate p helps identify entity e if and only if p elucidates the ontological status
of e in light of a linguistic or cognitional element w.

Often without the assistance of a p, a w is unable to refer to an e. Though not
indispensable for referential relations, predication is significant for elucidating the
ontological character of entities that facilitates referential relations.14
Not unlike reference, however, the aim of predication is to make sense of reality
through ontological categories. By helping elucidate the type, genus, attribute, or mode of
entities that are otherwise ambiguous, predicates make physical or theoretical realities
meaningful.15 That is, predicates individuate entities so that they can be set apart from all

14. It should be noted that predicates do not only assist referential relations. Rather a predicate in
and of itself can act as the linguistic or cognitional element in the framework of reference. Known as the
demonstrative use, predicates can be paired or linked with an entity by simply pointing to it. For instance,
without using the linguistic or cognitional element Nikola Jokic, I could simply point to the individual
denoted by Nikola Jokic and say, “That is a Serbian basketball player.” In this way, I would be directly
pairing or linking an individual with the predicate (i.e., “a Serbian basketball player”) and thus bypassing
the proper name all together.
15. E. J. Lowe, “Categorial Predication,” Ratio 25 (2012): 383–86.
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other entities.16 Thus the principle function of predication is to categorize entities by their
ontological character.
Common Mistake Made with Reference and Predication
The ability to make the distinction between the functions of reference and
predication is paramount for any argument that uses a philosophy of language. Failure to
make this distinction leads to the notion that predication is primarily used to establish the
identity of entities with the intent to refer to them.17 This is conceived in simple dyadic
terms: p = e,18 where p is stated about e exclusively with the aim to establish e’s identity
in order that it can be referenced. Under these pretenses, predication retains its relational
character between two (or more) entities but does so to exclusively elucidate the identity
of entities so that they can be referenced.
Though an important aim, the inability to understand the particular functions of
reference and predication obscures their particular uses. For instance, the dyadic nature
often used to secure the identity of entities maintains little to no recognition of an
ontological structure of reality. This is because a p = e structure does not qualify entities
by ontological category, which leaves entities with little (if any) independent and distinct
characteristics that keep them from being confused with other entities. A dyadic structure
obscures referential relations because it does not accommodate any notion of “what there
is” in reality. Simply attributing p of e does not say anything ontological about p or e

16. Evans, “Reference and Contingency,” 162–66.
17. This is not to say that failure to make the current distinction results only in predicates being
used dyadically. There could be an alternate result by failing to make this distinction. However, my
inference is that failure to make this distinction primarily results in dyadic form.
18. Lowe, “Categorial Predication,” 369–71.
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given that neither is qualified. The result is that e is not identified and p maintains little (if
any) meaning. The claims about reality that arise from this “thin and superficial”
understanding of reference and predication are what Lowe calls “ontology lite” since
there is nothing remotely ontological about a dyadic structure.19
In less analytical terms, failure to make this distinction is epitomized in Volf’s
construal of whether Muslims and Christians worship the same God. Building his
argument on sufficient similarity, he concludes that Muslims and Christians worship the
same God given that they predicate similar and at times identical “things” of God.
However, the way in which he maintains this argument does not appeal to a categorial
structure of reality. When he argues that Muslims and Christians agree that God is one,
creator, good, love, and entirely different from creation, it is unclear what exactly Volf
believes they agree on.20 The simple fact that he does not commit himself to an
ontological structure of reality makes his claim that Muslims and Christians maintain
“agreement on these [five predicates]” ambiguous at best.21
The outcome is that without a formal commitment to an ontological structure of
reality, his argument that Muslims and Christians share a common set of predicates is, in
Lowe’s mind, superficial. What arises from this ambiguous claim is that Muslims and
Christians agree upon five predicative “things” but it does not qualify what exactly those
“things” happen to be. For instance, he argues that Islam and Christianity agree that God

19. Lowe, “Categorial Predication,” 369–71.
20. Volf, Allah: A Christian Response, 95–110.
21. Volf, Allah: A Christian Response, 110.
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is good.22 However, outside of a thin scriptural witness (1 John 4:16; Al Buruj, 85:14),
Volf establishes neither the exactitudes of the Islamic nor the Christian conception of
God’s goodness.23 All that arises from his claim is that Islam and Christianity agree upon
a predicative “thing” that they mutually call “goodness.” But what Muslims and
Christians agree upon about the predicative “thing” they call “goodness” is arbitrary
given that Volf’s construal lacks a categorial structure of reality.
One must infer from this lack of philosophical analysis that Volf’s project has
little (if any) normative value in assessing whether Muslims and Christians worship the
same God. If basic distinctions such as the current one are conflated, the use of
philosophical terms such as reference and predication can only be misleading.24 Many
find Volf’s argument convincing largely because he claims that Muslims and Christians
agree upon many key theological truths.25 As determined, however, Volf uses
philosophical terms like reference and predication, yet does not understand their
particular functions. Therefore because he is unable to ascertain nuanced distinctions, his
project remains, on the one hand, imprecise and uncritical and, on the other hand,
misleading.

22. Volf, Allah: A Christian Response, 99–101.
23. Volf, Allah: A Christian Response, 101.
24. Remember what he says toward the apex of his argument: “When Christians and Muslims
agree [that God is one, creator, good, love, and entirely different from creation], then in their worship of
God they refer to the same object” (original emphasis).
25. This is not to say that further evaluation of the subdisciplines of philosophy (e.g., philosophy
of mind, philosophy of religion, epistemology) and, more broadly, the fields of theology and history will
not lead one to say that Muslims and Christians worship the same God. However, this is to say that
imprecise and “superficial” arguments have no place in this area or any area of inquiry.
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People who have read Volf on this topic will point to the fact that his argument
appeals to scriptural witness rather than philosophical evidence. Under these pretenses, it
would be emphasized that Muslims and Christians maintain a similar scriptural
perspective and thus share several common predicates of God (e.g., good, love).
However, this position seems question begging insofar as the argument relies upon the
premise that Scripture develops and maintains a formal commitment to a categorial
structure of reality. Though I am not in a position to formally make this argument, it is
unlikely that Scripture upholds a formal commitment on ontology. Regardless of his
appeal to a Scriptural witness, there remains no ontological commitment that supports his
position that Muslims and Christians share a common set of theological predicates.26
Toward Further Clarity of Predication
With a proper understanding of reference and predication and the dangers that
company their conflation, I am in a position to determine more precisely how predicates
function. By employing a categorial structure of reality, the following section works
toward a two-part distinction in predication. Because predicates clarify what constitutes a
particular entity by ontological character (i.e., type, genus, attribute, mode), it is intuitive
that some predicates would do this in a more irreducible and unique way than others.
Take, for example, the difference between what I am calling generic and specific
predicates. Generic predicates are exemplified in statements such as “Nikola Jokic is
tall.” Here we have a linguistic or cognitional element (i.e., the proper name) and a

26. For more on this point, see Jon McGinnis, “The hiddenness of ‘divine hiddenness’: divine love
in medieval Islamic lands,” in Hidden Divinity and Religious Belief: New Perspectives, ed. Adam Green
and Eleonore Stump (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2015), 157–74. In his essay, he presents
convincing evidence that the Islamic and Christian conceptions of God’s love are different claims. He
thinks that the theological and philosophical conceptions of the Trinity and Tawhid greatly affect how
predicates (particularly the predicate of love) operate in the life of God.
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predicate (i.e., the characteristic) that informs us about a specific individual. In this
example, however, the characteristic (i.e., tall) is not an irreducible or unique predicate
exclusively of Nikola Jokic. Instead the predicate remains nonspecific with regards to
quality and extent and clarifies only a particular entity’s ontological character in a vague
sense. Therefore, generic predicates primarily convey the ontological type, genus,
attribute, or mode of entities that are not indicative exclusively of only one entity.
To explain further, say my colleague and I are at the same sporting event as
previously discussed. My colleague, at this point, has apparently come to recognize
Nikola Jokic and says, “Nikola Jokic is large.” Here my colleague is using a generic
predicate (i.e., large) with the intent to categorize the individual she believes we have
come to watch by his ontological character. By alluding to the individual with a
nonspecific predicate, my colleague has said something ontologically true but not
irreducible or unique of Nikola Jokic.
Yet someone might ask, “Why does ‘large’ constitute a generic predicate if we
have reason to suppose that your colleague is referencing the correct individual and
‘large’ is contextually indicative of that individual?” Put differently, if by indication
Nikola Jokic is large, why does it constitute a generic predicate?
Though a reasonable question, there are nevertheless convincing reasons to
suggest otherwise: (1) Even though large is indicative of Nikola Jokic, the predicate lacks
any qualification on the extent or quality of his individual largeness. Simply predicating
large, though informative, is not precise exclusively of Nikola Jokic. In a different sense,
large is a relative claim given that it merely determines that Nikola Jokic is not short
(whatever that may imply). Therefore my colleague uses a predicate without further
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qualification. (2) Provided that this is a professional sporting event, large is not, by all
likelihood, specific to one individual. There are other individuals on the basketball court
who would be considered large. Contextually speaking, the predicate is not specific to
Nikola Jokic exclusively. Thus given the ontological ambiguity accompanying (1) and
(2), there is adequate evidence to catalogue large as a generic predicate. In other words, if
there is little qualification with respect to (1) and (2), then predicates like large should be
regarded as generic in kind.
Yet someone might reply, “True, large qualifies as a generic predicate in this
situation given (1) and (2); however, what if the context changes and Nikola Jokic is
playing basketball in a ‘vacuum.’ Would large not specify something irreducible and
unique of Nikola Jokic?” That is, if one and only one individual satisfies the predicate
large from a contextual perspective, can it not be said that the predicate is irreducible and
unique of the individual? Not necessarily. At best this scenario bypasses (2).27 Yet there
still remains no resolve with (1) given that there is little clarification with respect to
extent or quality accompanying a statement such as “Nikola Jokic is large.”
As for specific predication, take the following example: “Nikola Jokic is the 41st
overall pick in the 2014 NBA draft.” Like several of the previous examples, there is
linguistic or cognitional element (i.e., Nikola Jokic) that is further clarified by a predicate
(i.e., the 41st overall pick in the 2014 NBA draft). Unlike in previous examples, this
predicate is irreducible and unique to a particular individual that cannot be true of any
other entity. Instead of vaguely alluding to Nikola Jokic with generic predicates, a

27. Though I think this specific example does not bypass inference (2), I want to keep the
possibility open that an example like it could actually do so. It seems that a more accurate predicate in a
similar example could bypass inference (2).
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specific predicate refers to Nikola Jokic in a noncontingent manner. By drawing attention
to one specific individual, this kind of predicate rules out all other entities. So specific
predicates clarify, like their generic counterpart, by ontological type, genus, attribute, and
mode, though specific predicates do so by what is irreducible and unique of an entity.
To illustrate what is entailed in specific predicates, take the following criteria. The
first is that specific predicates express the ontological type, genus, attribute, or mode held
true about a specific entity. As the previous example illuminates, Nikola Jokic is the only
individual that satisfies the 41st overall pick in the 2014 NBA draft.28 No other
individual, properly speaking, is able to satisfy such a predicate. It is irreducible and
unique exclusively of Nikola Jokic given that he is in fact the 41st overall pick in the
2014 NBA draft. Thus as the first criterion, specific predicates are true of one and only
one entity.
The second criterion is best articulated in what Bruce Marshall calls “communal
centrality and epistemic primacy.”29 According to Marshall, there are certain beliefs in a
community that maintain precedence over other beliefs. Largely based on their
normativity, some beliefs are privileged, given that a community’s identity is built around

28. It should be noted that while the 41st overall pick in the 2014 NBA draft is particular to the
individual represented by Nikola Jokic, there are ways that the predicate could be indicative of a different
individual altogether. For instance, instead of reflecting the individual represented by Nikola Jokic, this
predicate could be used in the context of a fictional character (e.g., Saturday Night Live) where the
predicate would be indictive of someone who is not the actual individual. In other words, there are
exceptions to this example, though I would argue that such examples are rare and thus unwarranted
objections against the current argument.
29. Bruce Marshall, Trinity and Truth (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 44–49.
Provided that this project is specifically focused on a philosophy of language, the terminology of
epistemology in Marshall’s project should not be confused as being indicative of my project. Though
epistemology has implications for the current topic, I am not specifically dealing those in my project.
Therefore, even though Marshall’s project uses epistemology, I am still using his current terminology,
given that it highlights what is entailed in specific predication.
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a limited set of core beliefs. Though this “sound[s] arcane,” Marshall nevertheless argues
that this notion is a presupposition among most thinking people.30 To prove this
inference, take the following example: Suppose my colleague believes (A) that Nikola
Jokic is a top twenty-five basketball player and (B) no top twenty-five basketball player
is European.31 Both of these beliefs, of course, cannot be maintained under the rules of
logic because Nikola Jokic is regarded as a top twenty-five basketball player and is
ethnically Serb. Given the apparent conflict, one belief must be modified in relation to the
other if either (or both) of them is to be maintained. In this instance, belief (B) must
change provided that Nikola Jokic is, on the one hand, a top twenty-five basketball player
and, on the other hand, belief (A) is primary between the two beliefs.32
The importance of this concept for the current thesis is why beliefs such as (A)
are fundamental for communal identity. In the simplest of terms, Marshall maintains that
beliefs such as (A) are fundamental for communal identity because they are what he
terms essential and central beliefs.33 In light of the first, beliefs like (A) are essential
because the identity (or authenticity) of a community depends upon them for its own
preservation. If essential beliefs are not preserved in a community, its identity and
subsequently the community will cease to exist. That is because beliefs like (A) orient
members of a community to embrace a common vision that is representative of their

30. Marshall, Trinity and Truth, 46.
31. This is modified from Marshall’s example. For the original example, see Trinity and Truth,
46–47.
32. I take it that belief (A) is more dominant simply by intuition. There could be instances, I
suppose, where belief (B) is more dominant than belief (A). Of course, some of this will depend upon the
content of the beliefs and some of it will depend upon the identity of the community making the delineation
between two (or more) beliefs.
33. Marshall, Trinity and Truth, 44–49.
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identity. Without an agreed upon list of essential beliefs, a community does not have
common vision to unite on that would preserve its existence. Second, beliefs like (A) are
central because they are indispensable for the preservation of a community and become
the “most characteristic among [a] particular collection of beliefs.” These kinds of beliefs
become central to the community because they are the core convictions among its
members. Since omission of beliefs such as (A) results in the loss of a community’s
identity, they are maintained unapologetically. Understood in this way, a community
maintains certain beliefs as essential for its existence and in turn protects them by making
them central within its belief structure.
If Marshall is correct, the outcome of holding some beliefs as essential and central
is paramount for understanding the second criterion of specific predicates. As stated
above, if a conflict arises between two beliefs (e.g., beliefs (A) and (B) above), it
necessitates a reorganization of the beliefs maintained in a community. This can be done
in one of two ways. The first way is to reject outright the less important of the two
beliefs. In the situation that two beliefs are incompatible, the more essential and central of
the two beliefs is kept while the other one is omitted from the belief structure. The second
way is more nuanced where the less important belief is modified with the intent to
establish congruency between it and the more essential and central belief. By working
toward the harmonization of the belief structure, the more essential and central belief
holds precedence over the less important belief. As such, the less important belief is
modified while the more essential and central belief is maintained in its original sense.
Either situation restructures beliefs in a way that circumvents inconsistency by complying
with the more essential and central of the beliefs.
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To succinctly articulate the distinction between generic and specific predication,
being said of is characteristic of specific predicates, while being in (or inhering in) is
characteristic of generic predicates.34 That is, specific predicates express what is
irreducible and unique of an entity while generic predicates are more universal in reality.
The distinction between generic and specific predication, then, is primarily ontological
where entities are configured into a categorial structure of reality. From this perspective,
generic and specific predicates comprise (in the technical sense) predication; however,
they elucidate entities by different ontological means that make sense of physical or
theoretical realities in their own respective way.
Predication as It Relates to Theology
It is now essential to identify the theological implications of generic and specific
predication. Given their categorial distinction, generic and specific predication
accommodate implications for how to speak of God. I thus seek to determine the
predicates that Muslims and Christians attribute to God as they relate to this categorial
distinction. As illustrated in the example offered by Volf, it is not enough to simply say
that Muslims and Christians agree upon a set of theological predicates apart from a
categorial structure of reality. Therefore, I outline the various theological implications of
generic and specific predication that ultimately safeguards my project from a “thin and
superficial” ontological perspective.
The first is that predicative phrases such as “God is good” or “God, you are
loving” are, under my categorial distinction, generic in kind.35 On the one hand, neither

34. Lowe, “Categorial Predication,” 369–86.
35. In the Islamic tradition, this would entail the ninety-nine beautiful names of God. For a list and
philosophical explanation of them, see Al-Ghazālī, The Ninety-Nine Beautiful Names of God, trans. David
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“God is love” nor “God, you are good” is irreducible or unique exclusively of God.
Because there is little (if any) qualification with respect to extent or quality, these
predicates cannot be attributed exclusively to God. For instance, it is not unreasonable to
say that “Nikola Jokic is good” or “Nikola Jokic, you are loving” when the context lends
such predicative phrases. On the other hand, though predicative phrases such as “God is
good” and “God, you are loving” are significant from a theological perspective, neither is
essential or central as Marshall describes.36 That is, predicative phrases like “God is
good” and “God, you are loving” are not the most fundamental beliefs for either the
Islamic or Christian communities. There are still other beliefs that are more essential and
central that would hold sway over God’s goodness and love. Therefore, predicative
phrases such as these should be regarded as generic in kind since they clarify what is
neither irreducible nor unique exclusively of God.
The second of the predicative phrases “God is Triune” and “God is Tawhid”
should be regarded as specific in kind.37 Unsurprisingly antithetical to the contours of

B. Burrell (Cambridge: The Islamic Texts Society, 1992). One might also see Nader El-Bizri, “God:
essence and attributes,” in The Cambridge Companion to Classical Islamic Theology, ed. Tim Winter (New
York: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 121–40.
36. This, of course, is with orthodox Muslims and Christians in mind. I am thus bracketing off
nonorthodox communities and their particular theological outlooks for logistical reasons. Given the
project’s length, I do not have room to explain the factors that would be entailed with unorthodox positions.
37. This may be shortsighted; however, I do not think there are any other predicates that maintain
the contours of specific predicates. Though I think the Incarnation (and subsequently the crucifixion) is
primary and could be argued to be a specific predicate, it seems that Trinity is an all in compassing claim
about God. It is the incarnation that leads to Trinitarian theology. The incarnation focuses on the second
person of the Triune God, not the Triune God in and of Godself. Thus I find the Trinity to be a more basic
claim about God in and of Godself than the incarnation. The Trinity is a more totalizing claim about God
than the incarnation. In light of such a construal, I think the Trinity is the only predicate that is specific in
kind.
As for the Islamic tradition, it seems that Tawhid is scripturally and theologically the apex of the
Islamic conception of God. All other predicates seem peripheral. If God is in anyway numerically
compounded, then all other predicates do not have an operative basis in the life of God given that God
would be unable to subsist. Thus to reflect this theological perspective, God is always affirmed in God’s
oneness in the Islamic tradition (though it could be argued that even oneness is numerical).
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generic predication, these predicative phrases would be considered specific for two
reasons. The first is that, for their corresponding communities, “God is Trinity” and “God
is Tawhid” are irreducible and unique exclusively of God. There is nothing from the
standpoint of philosophical theology that could satisfy the ontological character of either
the Trinity or Tawhid other than God. They are so specific with regard to extent and
quality that neither could be embodied by anything other than God. In other words, the
Trinity and Tawhid are so philosophically and theologically particular that it is
inconceivable that they could be indicative of any other entity aside from God.
The second is that the Trinity and Tawhid qualify as theologically essential and
central for their corresponding communities. One way of illustrating their essential and
central character is showcasing their rudimentary quality in liturgical rites.38 For instance,
the Trinity is not only invoked for Christians in eucharistic practice, but it is also
saturated throughout the liturgy (e.g., creedal statements, signum crucis). Remove
Trinitarian language and imagery from the liturgy, and the community no longer has the
theological basis that unites them. As argued by George, exclusion of the Trinity also
excludes doctrines and beliefs such as the incarnation and crucifixion from these
liturgical rites. The Trinity in this sense binds together several core Christian beliefs that
are not easily omitted from the community. Likewise, Tawhid is the theological basis

It also should be noted that “low churches” (Protestant in kind) will probably deemphasize the
central and essential quality of the Trinity as depicted here. For reasons of emphasis, the incarnation (and
subsequently the crucifixion) will probably assume primacy. This, however, should not cause any
confusion when it comes to evaluating my argument. As I said above, I take the Trinity to be the only
predicate irreducible and unique of God, with the assumption that the incarnation reflects in the Trinity.
That is, my thesis focuses on God in God’s totality (i.e., Father, Son, and Spirit). Though the Incarnation is
paramount for Trinitarian theology, it nevertheless focuses primarily on the second person of a Triune God.
38. Marshall, Trinity and Truth, 24.
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within Islamic liturgical rites. Invoked not only during the Shahada (profession of faith),
it is also recited at the beginning and end of each liturgical cycle.39 Moreover, the
elimination of Tawhid would result in the negation or adaption of Adhan (the call to
prayer) that united Muslims everywhere at least three to five times per day. The doctrine
of Tawhid in this way upholds Islamic identity. Depicted in the rhythms of liturgy then,
the Trinity and Tawhid are essential and central because their corresponding communities
are built on and promoted by them.40
An initial objection to the distinction between generic and specific predicates as
they relate to God is what I call an argument from mysticism. The argument goes as
follows:

(3) If God is mysterious, then God’s ontological status is unknown.
(4) God is mysterious as maintained by Muslims and Christians.
(5) Thus neither Muslims nor Christians have access to God’s ontological status.
(6) Thus any distinction made between generic and specific predicates is pointless
because God is utterly mysterious.

39. Shahada in its religious sense denotes the Islamic profession of faith: “I bear witness that there
is no deity but God, and I bear witness that Muhammad is the massager of God.”
40. If there still remains doubt concerning specific predicates as they relate to God, take one more
example of how Islam and Christianity promote the Trinity and Tawhid. As illustrated by Meghan Sullivan,
Islam and Christianity concern themselves with the misattribution of belief about God. Both traditions
agree on the prohibition of sacrilegious speech epitomized in Exod 20: “You shall not make wrongful use
of the name of the Lord your God, for the Lord will not acquit anyone who misuses his name.” In this
sense, Islam and Christianity maintain a keen interest in upholding right belief about God that their moral
fabric reflects. See Meghan Sullivan, “Semitics for Blasphemy,” in Oxford Studies in Philosophy of
Religion vol 4, ed. Jonathan L Kvanvig (New York: Oxford University Press, 2012): 159–72.
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By enlarging the ontological dissimilarity between God and humanity, this argument
downplays doctrinal insights to mitigate conflicting theological insights. Though an
appealing argument, this approach overstates the mysterious character of God. From the
beginning of the argument in premise (3), the claim seems to be built on the assumption
that mystery entails ontological obscurity in the life of God. This results in the
deemphasis of justified belief (e.g., revelation, sensory perception). Such an assumption
makes it difficult for religious communities to construct a theological basis that unites
people because a theological basis requires warranted beliefs. Thus it is difficult to
imagine how a community would maintain its identity aside from retaining warranted
beliefs.
A more substantive objection is to argue that predicative phrases such as “God is
good” and “God, you are loving” qualify as essential and central beliefs. Goodness and
love are fundamental attributes in God’s essence as maintained by Muslims and
Christians, so much so that if neither were true, God would cease to subsist and
subsequently creation would lack the sustenance for its preservation (i.e., providence).
Thus the objection is that the goodness and love of God must be essential and central
beliefs because the phenomenal world remains stable and intact.
Though attentive to detail, such an objection misunderstands what is entailed in
beliefs that are essential and central. As previously mentioned, beliefs that are essential
and central maintain precedence over other beliefs. However, precedence does not always
mean that other less fundamental beliefs must be omitted. Instead, when one belief
maintains precedence over another belief, the less fundamental of the two needs only to
be modified in relation to the belief that is essential and central. Though occasionally two
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beliefs will be incompatible with one another, it does not necessarily follow that they
cannot be modified in a way that makes them harmonious. For instance, if the Trinity or
Tawhid is maintained as primary in a belief structure, less rudimentary beliefs such as
goodness and love do not necessarily need to be omitted. Instead beliefs such as goodness
and love need only to be modified to fit a Trinitarian or Tawhidian conception of God.41
Conclusion
Within this chapter I have outlined and developed two major distinctions in
philosophy of language as it relates to God. The first was between reference and
predication. I claimed that reference primarily holds between a linguistic or cognitional
element and a physical or theoretical entity that allow for entities to be tracked, picked
out, and information stated or acquired about them. On the flip side, I argued that
predication clarifies what kind of “thing” an entity is from an ontological perspective.
The second was between generic and specific predicates. I argued that generic predicates
are nonspecific with regard to quality and extent and clarify only by ontological type,
genus, attribute, or mode in a vague sense. As for specific predicates, I claimed that they
express, on the one hand, what is irreducible and unique of an entity while, on the other
hand, they are the most essential and central claims about an entity. Thus generic
predicates are more universal in reality while specific predicates are indicative of only
one entity.

41. This should make good sense to those who are familiar with contemporary theology. For
example, as recent scholarship has tried to show, it makes good philosophical sense that if God is Triune,
then God must necessarily be a relational sort of being. Given that God is conceived as three persons in
one Godhead, it must necessarily follow that God is relational in and of the three persons of the Trinity. As
such, scholars in this sense have predicated the notion of relation to God in light of a Trinitarian conviction.
In this way, scholars have modified the ways in which we predicate characteristics of God to fit a
Trinitarian conception such as the predicate of relation. For a good first read on this point, see Richard
Swinburne, The Christian God (New York: University of Oxford Press, 1994), 170–91.
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Serving as preliminary distinctions for my forthcoming argument, I am in a
position to answer whether Muslims and Christians worship the same God. Thus in the
next chapter I turn to answer the question based on philosophy of language.
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CHAPTER III
THEY REFER TO BUT DO NOT WORSHIP
Introduction
In this chapter, I determine that Muslims and Christians refer to but do not
worship the same God. I advance this claim with two lines of argumentation. The first
illustrates that reference takes hold at the junction between a causal-historical account
and a list of descriptions held true about a particular entity. I determine from this that
Muslims and Christians cooperatively meet both conditions for reference and thus refer to
the same God. This conclusion primarily hinges upon a shared monotheism and a
common set of generic predicates. The second determines that reference is not equivalent
to worship. Most vividly illustrated in liturgical rites, worship entails particular and
concrete predicates held true about entities. Between these arguments, I establish that
reference primarily operates with respect to generic predication while worship entails
specific predicates. My argument thus is that reference is common between Muslims and
Christians while worship is not.
Setting the Scene
Prior to establishing these arguments, I need to highlight three theories for
developing a response to whether Muslims and Christians refer to and subsequently
worship the same God. By locating my project in terms of philosophy of language, my
line of argumentation grapples with the particularities of what establishes reference. In a
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sense, these theories provide the backdrop from which my argument emerges. Thus a
proper understanding of each is a vital preliminary step for making sense of my claim.
The first of these theories is called the descriptive theory of reference (DTR), also
known as descriptivism. Epitomized in Donnellan’s analysis, the theory follows as:1

a n refers to an e when said by a s if and only if the descriptive content associated
with the n applies exclusively to e and only e for the s.2

In less deductive terms, reference by description holds between a proper name and an
entity when the entity satisfies the descriptive content associated with the proper name.
For instance, upon use of Nikola Jokic, the proper name intends to refer to the individual
that satisfies “the 41st overall pick in the 2014 NBA draft.” That is, reference holds
between the proper name and the individual if and only if Nikola Jokic is the individual
that satisfies the description (i.e., the 41st overall pick in the 2014 NBA draft). A rather
simple example, DTR is often more complex since entities are usually associated with
various descriptions. For example, it is not unlikely that predicates other than “the 41st
overall pick in the 2014 NBA draft” will be associated with Nikola Jokic (e.g., large,
Serb). In situations where multiple descriptions are associated with an e, the n refers to

1. For other construal’s of the descriptive theory of reference, see Bertrand Russell, “On
Denoting,” Mind 114:873–87; Paul Grice, Studies in the Way of Words (Massachusetts: Harvard University
Press, 1989).
2. Donnellan, “Reference and Definite Descriptions” 265–77. I adapted this version from Meghan
Sullivan’s construal of the theory. See Sullivan, “Semantics for Blasphemy,” 159–72.
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whatever e that satisfies all, most, or the more important of the possible descriptions. In
this sense, DTR holds between descriptive content and entities.3
An alternate theory to DTR, the second theory establishes reference by
testimonial exchange rather than by description. Developed by Kripke, the causalhistorical theory of reference (CHTR) operates in the following way:

a n refers to e when said by a s if and only if either (1) s “baptized” e with n or (2)
s was told by another member of the testimonial chain that n stands for e and thus
uses n with the intent to refer to e.4

For routes (1) and (2), the basic phenomenon is that an e is associated with a n in order
that members along the testimonial chain will be able to refer to e. Beginning with route
(1), Kripke believes that an e can acquire a n when a s has a unique perceptible
experience (i.e., baptismal moment) of the e in such a way that s names the e. Once this
initial perceptible experience has occurred, it is then passed from member to member
along the testimonial chain as illustrated in (2). Kripke’s theory thus is a cooperative
exchange between members of a community that consistently invoke the initial
perceptible experience of the e by the original s with the use of the n.5

3. Donnellan’s construal of DTR is important in light of several of its unique contributions. One
such contribution made by Donnellan is that a name can still refer to an entity regardless of whether the
description(s) are indictive of the entity. For more on this point, read the famous example of the man
holding the martini glass. See Donnellan, “Reference and Definite Descriptions” 265–77.
4. Kripke, Naming and Necessity, 80–86. See also Sullivan, “Semantics for Blasphemy,” 159–72.
5. If the causal-historical theory of reference (CHTR) seems far-fetched, given that information is
transmitted by testimonial exchange, read Kripke, Naming and Necessity. Also see Benjamin McMyler,
Testimony, Trust, and Authority (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011).
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Kripke develops this theory in opposition to DTR because he determines that
descriptivism is unable to account for irregularities common among referential relations.
To illustrate DTR’s inability to account for these irregularities, Kripke develops an
objection called Gödel-Schmidt. The objection goes as follows:

Kurt Friedrich Gödel is associated with the predicate “proved mathematical
theorem x.” Gödel, however, was not the founder of the theorem given that he
stole the theorem from a person by the name of Schmidt. Subsequently, he took
exclusive credit for the theorem. Thus when “proved mathematical theorem x” is
predicated of Gödel, there is a propensity to say (in light of DTR) that Gödel
“proved mathematical theorem x.” This, however, is false because Gödel did not
prove the theorem but rather stole it from Schmidt.6

About this objection, Kripke argues that DTR can refer only to one of two things. Either
the predicate “proved mathematical theorem x” refers to Gödel (the thief) or it refers to
nobody at all. It cannot refer to the individual that proved the theorem if, under the
pretense of Gödel-Schmidt, there is no adequate reason to link Schmidt with the predicate
“proved mathematical theorem x.” As long as Schmidt remains in obscurity, there is
insufficient reason to link or pair him with theorem x in light of DTR. Therefore,
according to Kripke, Schmidt is left in obscurity and false claims are propagated about
Gödel under DTR.

6. The Gödel-Schmidt objection is adapted from Kripke. For the full version of the objection, see
Kripke, Naming and Necessity, 83–4.
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Lastly, an alternate theory to DTR and CHTR is often called the hybrid theory of
reference (HTR), which was developed by Evans.7 Under this theory of reference, a
proper name is causally-historically handed from member to member much like CHTR
but does not exclude descriptive content (i.e., DTR) when assessing referential relations.
In this sense, s attributes n to an e during her initial and unique perceptible experience
while also perceiving and thus attaching a catalogue of information (i.e., dossier) to the e.
When the s says (or thinks) the n, it not only draws attention to the e, but it also
accentuates the descriptive content attached to the e during her perceptible experience.8
In the situation when the n is handed off to another member of the community, the
s is not responsible for indicating the e that n refers to but rather which proper name she
intends to use. Without indicating the correct n, the s is incapable of saying anything
about the proper e. Simply predicating p of e is does not specify which entity s intends to
reference. As illustrated in the example of Volf, simply saying that “something” is p does
not determine anything positive about that “something.” A better way forward, according
to Evans, is for the s to confirm the proper name she intends to use by corroborating the
proper name with its causal-historical chain and the descriptive content associate with it.
The argument here is that to refer to e, the s must confirm which proper name is
connected to e by corroborating it with its causal-historical account and the descriptive
content gained during s’s initial and unique perceptible experience.

7. For an initial notion see Gareth Evans, “Causal Theory of Names,” 314–25 and for a more
robust notion look at Gareth Evans, The Varieties of Reference (New York: Oxford University Press,
1982), 373–404. It should be noted that Evans never finished the latter of these works.
8. Evans, The Varieties of Reference, 394–95.
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As an alternate theory, Evens has reason for why DTR and CHTR are inadequate
for accounting for reference. To highlight these inadequacies, Evans agrees with Kripke’s
Gödel-Schmidt objection but disputes how CHTR does any better at accounting for the
irregularities common among referential relations. To articulate his dispute, Evans
develops an objection to CHTR by the title of Drifting Turnip. Evans outlines his
objection in the following way:

Young boy A by the name of Turnip leaves his small village to find his fortunes.
Many years later, a man B comes to the village to live as a hermit. Upon his
arrival, several of the original villagers believe that B is A who departed the
village years prior. The original villagers thus begin to say things such as, “Turnip
is coming to get coffee” or “Turnip lives over the hill.” These mistaken claims
make their way into circulation among the younger set of villagers. Once the
original villagers die off, the younger villagers will, in light of CHTR, use Turnip
to refer to B rather than A.9

As with this objection, CHTR is unable to account for drift (or change) in reference.
Since proper names (e.g., Turnip) are transmitted from member to member in a causalhistorical chain, it is not unlikely that reference can be altered in way that the name no
longer refers to the original entity. As exemplified in Drifting Turnip, false inferences are
made by the original villagers that results in the mistake between A and B. So misleading

9. The objection of Drifting Turnip is adapted from Evans. For the full version of the objection,
see Evans, “Causal Theory of Names,” 206–7.
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are these inferences, the original villagers mistake (over time) a young fortune seeker
with an old religious recluse. Much like the Gödel-Schmidt objection, Turnip can refer
either to B or to nobody at all. The proper name cannot refer to A (the correct individual)
given that the cluster of information associated with B (i.e., young fortune seeker) has
been altered with predicates like “lives over the hill” and “is a hermit.”
Beside including the combined strengths of DTR and CHTR, the importance of
HTR is that it considers the appropriate information for establishing reference. According
to Evans, descriptive content (in light of causal-historical chain) establishes reference not
by descriptive fit but by what is most dominant in the body of information about an
entity.10 Though Evans argues that dominance often pinpoints something particular in an
entity’s dossier, he also leaves open the possibility that informational spread can be
dominant. As he says, “Dominance is not simply a function of amount of information”
though “detail in a particular area can be outweighed by [informational] spread” (original
emphasis).11 I take this to mean that, in the example of Nikola Jokic, “the 41st overall
pick in the 2014 NBA draft” is not always more dominant than predicative spread that
includes descriptions such as “tall,” “large,” and “European.”
Thus with respect to the forthcoming argument, I presume predicative spread is
generally most dominant during the referential use of proper names. Though there are

10. Evans, “Causal Theory of Names,” 201.
11. Evans, “Causal Theory of Names,” 201. To further comment on this quotation, Evans’s theory
is primarily concerned with what is most central within an entity’s dossier. That is why Evans rules out
descriptive fit in exchange for what is truly dominant in the dossier of an entity. He argues thus for
descriptive dominance over descriptive fit; however, he does not rule out what he calls informational
spread. Thus I am offering fair warning that descriptive fit should not be mistaken for information spread.
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bound to be exceptions to this rule, as my upcoming argument illustrates, proper names in
everyday use tend to refer with respect to what is neither irreducible nor unique of an
entity. In other words, proper names are inclined to refer to their intended entity (in light
of a causal-historical account) because they are connected to descriptive content that does
not pinpoint something particular in an entity.
A Common God in Reference
At this point I believe HTR is a more substantive theory of reference because it
maintains the strengths of DTR and CHTR. By utilizing a causal-historical exchange and
descriptive content, HTR appeals to a wider deposit of evidence for establishing
reference. As such, HTR bypasses the objections of Gödel-Schmidt and Drifting Turnip
because DTR and CHTR facilitate each other by appealing to different facets for what
establishes reference.
To illustrate just how HTR bypasses the objections of Gödel-Schmidt and
Drifting Turnip, take once again how DTR and CHTR are occasionally unable to
establish reference. As seen in the Gödel-Schmidt objection, DTR has an inability to link
Schmidt with “proved mathematical theorem x.” DTR either references the incorrect
individual or no individual at all. It cannot, in any justifiable capacity, refer to Schmidt
(i.e., the correct individual) because he has no causal-historical connection to the
theorem. Likewise, CHTR is also unable to refer to young boy A since it appeals to a
causal-historical exchange. As the objection of Drifting Turnip illustrates, a causalhistorical exchange either, under these circumstances, refers to the incorrect individual or
no individual at all. It too cannot refer to the correct individual (i.e., A) because the
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original villagers cannot verify B’s ontological character without assessing the cluster of
information associate with B.
By contrast, HTR mends these incongruences by incorporating the strengths of
DTR and CHTR. This permits Schmidt and young boy A to be properly referenced. For
instance, if there had been a causal-historical connection between Schmidt and “proved
mathematical theorem x,” then it is unlikely that Gödel could have acquired unscrupulous
credit for the theorem. If the name Schmidt invoked “proved mathematical theorem x” or
“proven mathematical theorem x” invoked Schmidt and either one were linked with a
causal-historical chain, it is unlikely that Gödel could have acquired accreditation for the
theorem. Likewise in Drifting Turnip, if descriptive content had been connected to the
causal-historical exchange, it is improbable A would be mistake for B. If descriptions
such as “lives in the city” and “does not like coffee” had been added to the preexisting
causal-historical exchange, it is improbable that A would have been mistaken for B.
In either Gödel-Schmidt or Drifting Turnip, HTR is a better theory when
establishing reference. This is confirmed by Bogardus and Urban, who believe that the
combined benefit of DTR and CHTR is favored when deciding whether Muslims and
Christians worship the same God.12 They argue that combining a causal-historical
exchange with descriptive content not only establishes reference, but it also considers
how reference drifts over time. They believe the ways in which HTR accounts for
reference and referential drift plays a fundamental role when judging whether Muslims

12. I think it is reasonable to note that others, including Meghan Sullivan, find HTR to be the most
well-rounded theory of reference. This is to say, I think there has been plenty of thought done on HTR that
attributes to its legitimacy.
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and Christians worship the same God.13 To make this argument, Bogardus and Urban
introduce an example that, according to HTR, illustrates what is entailed in deciding
whether Muslims and Christians refer to and also worship the same God. This example I
call Saint or Claus:

Saint Nicholas and Santa Claus corefer to the same individual associated with
predicates like “3rd and 4th century Christian saint,” “born in Myra,” and
“celebrated for his anonymous gift giving.” Over time, however, the cluster of
information attached to Santa Claus begins to be associated with predicates like
“white bearded man,” “Nordic elf,” and “delivers gifts on Christmas.” In this
sense, Santa Claus undergoes referential drift in such a way that it becomes
ambiguous whether Santa Claus refers to the same entity associated with the
individual with the predicative phrase “Christian saint born in Myra.” In light of
referential drift, the question becomes whether Saint Nicholas and Santa Claus
corefer to the same individual after the original cluster of information has been
altered.14

13. Bogardus and Urban (including others and I) assume that reference is a prerequisite for
worship. That is, it cannot be established that Muslims and Christians worship the same God without first
establishing that they refer to the same God. As Bogardus and Urban put it, “We assume that . . . Muslims
and Christians worship the same God only if they refer to the same God.” The sequence thus for developing
a response to whether Muslims and Christians worship the same God is that it must first be established that
they refer to the same God. For more on this point, see Bogardus and Urban, “How to Tell” and Jeroen
Ridder and René Woudenberg, “Referring to, Believing in, and Worshiping the Same God,” Faith and
Philosophy 31 (2014): 46–67.
14. The example of Saint or Claus is adapted from Bogardus and Urban. For the full articulation of
example, see Bogardus and Urban, “How to Tell,” 185–94. Moreover, you can also find another
articulation of the example of Saint or Claus in Jerry Walls, “None Worship the Same God: A Different
Conception View,” in Do Christians, Muslims, and Jews Worship the Same God?: Four Views, ed. Ronnie
Campbell and Christopher Gnanakan (Grand Rapids: Zondervan Academics, 2019), 160–81.
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Much like other examples in previous sections, Saint or Claus portrays an
individual that is associated with descriptive content and is named. However, over time
the body of descriptive content associated with the individual begins to be altered with
the incorporation of different predicates. In the example, Santa Claus is originally
associated with “Christian saint born in Myra.” But over time, Santa Claus begins to be
associated with “Nordic elf who delivers gifts on Christmas.” In light of these alternate
predicates, the question becomes whether Santa Claus refers to the same individual as
Saint Nicholas or whether reference has been bifurcated. Toward these considerations,
Bogardus and Urban argue that HTR positions us in a way that informs our judgment on
such questions.
More importantly, Bogardus and Urban make the point that Saint or Claus
illustrates what is entailed in whether Muslims and Christians worship the same God. In
relation to the previous point, they argue that HTR positions us to decide whether
Muslims and Christians worship the same God given that it resembles the example of
Saint or Claus. For instance, in the same way that Saint Nicholas and Santa Claus are
originally associated with “Christian saint born in Myra,” Bogardus and Urban argue that
the Islamic and Christian conceptions of God originated from the same referent.15 They
believe that Islam and Christianity, largely drawn from the Abrahamic tradition,
maintain that God is an “omniscient, omnipotent creator, who spoke to Abraham.” With

15. Notice the language I am using here. Though not evident in the article of Bogardus and Urban,
I think it is safe to say that the Islamic and Christian conceptions of God evolved over an extended period
of time. I think it is a more logical sequence that Muslims and Christians originally conceived of God in
terms of the Abrahamic tradition. But, over time, it is likely that Muslims and Christians began to interpret
God’s activities in terms of their own particular experiences. It is in light of this evolutionary sequence that
I think we get theologies such as Tawhid and Trinity that are particular to their own traditions.
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time, however, either the Islamic, Christian, or both their understandings of God began to
incorporate alternate predicates. This, of course, jeopardizes reference by increasing the
chances of referential drift.
As the title of their work indicates (i.e., “How to Tell Whether Christians and
Muslims Worship the Same God”), Bogardus and Urban do not establish whether they
believe Muslims and Christians refer to and possibly worship the same God. Their article
exclusively establishes the conditions under which reference drifts and how we might
decide whether this has happened in the situation of Muslims and Christians. In this way,
Bogardus and Urban should not be understood as making normative claims on whether
Muslims and Christians worship the same God. Bogardus and Urban simply establish the
conditions under which reference and referential drift occur.
To ensure clarity of thought, however, Bogardus and Urban do not believe that
Saint Nicholas and Santa Claus corefer to the same entity as they once did.16 Given the
contemporary associations with Santa Claus (e.g., Nordic elf who delivers gifts on
Christmas), they argue that the predicative discrepancies between Saint Nicholas and
Santa Claus are too significant for coreference. According to them, Santa Claus in the
minds of contemporary children and parents almost exclusively refers to the individual
associated with “Nordic elf who delivers gifts on Christmas.” This is so much so that
Santa Claus cannot possibly refer to the individual associated with “Christian saint born
in Myra.” Thus Bogardus and Urban argue that the cluster of information associated with
Santa Claus has been altered to such an extent that the name cannot refer to Saint
Nicholas.

16. Bogardus and Urban, “How to Tell,” 192.
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Application of Bogardus and Urban
In relation to Bogardus and Urban, several have developed responses on whether
Muslims and Christians worship the same God.17 One such and particularly important
response for this thesis is developed by Jerry Walls. In conjunction with Bogardus and
Urban, Walls makes the argument that Muslims have so “radically” altered the
information associated with God that they no longer refer to God. He says,

As someone who thinks Christianity is true, I am inclined to think there has in fact
been a reference shift in the case of Islam but not Christianity. That is, the dossier
for ‘Allah’ includes claims that are so radically at odds with core Christian truth
claims that a reference shift has occurred such that ‘Allah’ does not refer to God.
Since Christians and Muslims do not even refer to the same God, they do not
worship the same God.18

Much like Bogardus and Urban do with Saint or Claus, Walls mimics their reasoning as it
relates to the question at hand. In the same way that Saint Nicholas and Santa Claus
originally referenced the same entity, Walls argues that God in the minds of Muslims and

17. Though Walls is not the only philosopher or theologian utilizing Bogardus and Urban, some
have critique their article. For example, see Francis J. Beckwith, “All Worship the same God: Referring to
the same God View,” in Do Christians, Muslims, and Jews Worship the Same God?: Four Views, ed.
Ronnie Campbell and Christopher Gnanakan (Grand Rapids: Zondervan Academics, 2019), 66–86.
18. Walls, “None Worship the Same God,” 167.
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Christians did the same thing.19 However, much in the same way that Santa Claus
underwent referential drift (i.e., from historical to fictional figure), Allah underwent the
same sort of change. Under this analysis, upon use of Allah by Muslims, the proper name
does not refer to the God attested in the Abrahamic tradition; rather, it refers to some
fictional reality.20
The underscore of his delimitation is that the Trinity (and subsequently the
incarnation) is primary in the life of God.21 His claim is that the God of the Abrahamic
tradition is Triune and thus any claim about God that is not regarded as such cannot
conceivably refer to the entity perceived by Abraham. Walls says, The Abrahamic God
“is the Trinitarian God . . . [and consequently], no alleged revelation that denies that
Jesus is the eternal Son of God, such as the Qur’an, could be revelation from God.”22 His
argument thus is that Muslims have altered their conception of Allah away from the
Abrahamic tradition and have embraced an Islamic conception of monotheism (i.e.,
Tawhid); therefore, they no longer refer to God as Christians in fact do.23
To locate Walls in the current thesis, recall from the previous chapter what I
labeled as generic and specific predicates. Walls appears to think that reference and

19. To ensure clarity, the reader must not confuse Allah as being an alternative name for God.
Rather Allah translates to God from the Arabic. Moreover, it is firmly held within scholarship that
etymologically Allah and God trace back to Judeo-Christian roots.
20. Walls, “None Worship the Same God,” 166.
21. I assume Walls would say on the flip side that Tawhid constitutes the most dominant
information in God’s dossier for Muslims. Though he never explicitly says that, I think for the sake of
maintaining consistency, he would make this claim.
22. Walls, “None Worship the Same God,” 165.
23. Notice the title of Walls chapter (i.e., “None Worship the Same God”). Not only does Walls
argument apply to Muslims, but also to Jews. As he says, “I shall take the negative answer [that all three do
not worship the same God] because I think it is true.” See Walls, “None Worship the Same God,” 160–61.
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referential drift rely primarily (if not exclusively) upon specific predicates in light of a
causal-historical exchange. Namely, only predicates that are irreducible and unique of an
entity (e.g., Nichola Jokic is 41st overall pick in the 2014 NBA draft) account for
reference and referential drift. When it comes to the question at hand, he relies on
specific predicative phases such as “God is Triune” rather than what I call generic
predicates (e.g., goodness, love). His argument thus tracks nicely with Bogardus and
Urban and their explanation of HTR, given that they argue that dominance pinpoints
something particular about an entity. In the same way that Santa Claus does not corefer
with Saint Nicholas, Walls argues that Allah no longer refers to the God of the
Abrahamic tradition because Muslims deny God as Triune. For Walls, the outcome of
their denial proves that reference has drifted in a way where Muslims and Christians no
longer refer to much less worship, the same God.
His line of argumentation is important because it frames the way in which I
develop my argument in the immediate pages. Though I agree neither with his conception
of dominance nor his overall conclusion on the question, he nevertheless illustrates how
one can use HTR to decide whether Muslims and Christians worship the same God. In
accord with Walls, the fact that HTR can assist our decision on Saint or Claus is enough
reason to use the theory for the current question. My argument thus uses HTR much in
the same as Walls; however, by focusing on the connection between proper names and
descriptive content, my argument diverges and even challenges Walls’ analysis.
Argument 1: Common God in Reference
What I have articulated so far is that HTR positions us to decide whether Muslims
and Christians worship the same God since the theory bypasses the objections of Gödel-
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Schmidt and Drifting Turnip. This is epitomized in Saint or Claus where HTR accounts
for reference and referential drift. Because I seek to argue that Muslims and Christians
refer to but do not worship the same God, the logical sequence of my argument is to
establish the conditions of reference before undertaking those related to worship.24 All of
this depends, of course, upon the legitimacy of HTR and its ability to determine whether
a proper name refers to its intended entity. Given that I think the HTR is legitimate for
my purposes, I attempt to determine whether Muslims and Christians meet the
appropriate conditions to refer to the same God.
Of course, any attempt to establish that Muslims and Christians refer to the same
God requires that they meet two conditions, according to HTR. The first is that Muslims
and Christians must share a causal-historical account that originates from the same initial
and unique perceptible experience. The second is that Muslims and Christians must agree
upon a dominant body of information about God. For any reason that either of these
cannot be agreed upon, reference and subsequently worship cannot be established
between Muslims and Christians. Thus any claim maintaining that Muslims and
Christians refer to the same God must validate that Muslims and Christians share both
conditions.

24. Once again, my project assumes that reference precedes worship. That is, we must first be able
to refer to an entity before we could ever worship that entity. Though several have supported this claim
(including Walls, Bogardus, and Urban), there are great philosophical challenges associated with this
inference. I do not have space or time to take up these philosophical challenges. But it is important to note
that I am assuming that reference precedes worship. See Walls, “None Worship the Same God,” 161.
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The First Condition of HTR
To begin with the first, it is nearly univocal in current research that Muslims and
Christians share a causal-historical account that traces back to the Abrahamic tradition.25
As Bogardus and Urban put it, “[T]here is no doubt that the use of Allah by Muslims
traces back to . . . the divine-name-using practice of Jews and Christians.”26 Primarily a
historical question (e.g., etymology, historical theology), there is sufficient evidence that
Allah when used by Muslims is primarily prompted by Jewish thought that permeated the
Gulf region through the infusion of Christianity. Thus Islam inherited Allah from the
same etymological origins as Christianity, which has links with the Abrahamic tradition.
This is an essential point because it demonstrates that God in the mouth of Muslims and
Christians springs from the same name-calling practice and not from “two distinct
practices involving the use of the [same] name.”27 Though this is an important research
topic that deserves greater attention, given the parameters of this thesis are primarily
philosophical, I do not have adequate space to deal with the historicity of this question.
However, I think it is safe to rely on the scholarly input on this point provided that the
research is nearly univocal with few outliers; thus there is adequate evidence that
Muslims and Christians share the same causal-historical chain.
This univocity is significant because it points to the fact that Muslims and
Christians share at least one of two conditions that determine common reference.
However, the question still remains whether Muslims and Christians share a dominant

25. For more on this point, see Bogardus and Urban, “How to Tell,” 192.
26. Bogardus and Urban, “How to Tell,” 192.
27. Evans, The Varieties of Reference, 380–82.
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cluster of information about God. In recent research, whether Muslims and Christians
share a body of information about God that qualifies as dominant has been the primary
dispute among philosophers and theologians. As illustrated earlier, there are several
different and conflicting expositions on this point (e.g., Volf, Turner, George). In light of
this variety and conflict, I devote the remainder of this section to argue that Muslims and
Christians agree upon the second condition of reference.
The Second Condition of HTR
As outlined in Evans, once a proper name has been associated with descriptive
content, that content is accentuated whenever the name is used by those in the namecalling practice. He demonstrates this with a simple example: “[E]veryone who is
introduced to the [name-calling practice of] ‘Robin Hood’ learns more or less the
legend.”28 Once people have been properly integrated into a name-calling practice (e.g.,
Robin Hood), the original descriptive content attached to the name (e.g., “bandit,” “uses a
longbow”) is elucidated in the minds of members of the community whenever the name
is used. This original descriptive content is unlikely to change in the name-calling
practice because it eventually becomes “common knowledge between members of the
practice.”29 Once the original descriptive content has become common knowledge among
members of the community, it should adjust only when new information is added since
the community’s identity is built on what is common among all members.30

28. Evans, The Varieties of Reference, 394.
29. Evans, The Varieties of Reference, 394–95.
30. Evans, The Varieties of Reference, 394–95.
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Evans’ point illustrates the innate quality of proper names to elucidate descriptive
content. However, this does not specify how exactly proper names do so. Even within
Evans’ theory of reference, it is unclear how a proper name such as Robin Hood
elucidates a predicative phrase such as “a bandit who robs the rich to feed the poor.”
Thus even within a robust exposition such as HTR, the question still remains: how do
proper names, from the perspective of philosophy of language, elucidate descriptive
content upon use? From an intuitive perspective, proper names elucidate descriptive
content according to the previous example. However, intuition is not a robust analysis of
proper names and their ability to elucidate descriptive content for assessing whether
Muslims and Christians meet the second condition of reference.
Thus to explain how proper names accentuate descriptive content, take Searle and
his explication of this dynamic.31 As a preliminary step for his explanation, Searle asks
how proper names refer to entities and how this differs from reference by definite
descriptions and demonstratives. That is, what unique linguistic mechanisms do proper
names maintain that permits them to refer to entities, and how do they differ from
singular expression like definite descriptions or demonstratives?32 On the one hand,
unlike proper names, definite descriptions refer because they are typically said about an
entity.33 For instance, “The 43rd president of United States” refers to the entity that
satisfies the description: the individual represented by George W. Bush. On the other

31. Searle, “Proper Names,” 166–73.
32. Searle, “Proper Names,” 170.
33. This dynamic is often called the Frege-Russell view given that Gottlob Frege and Bertrand
Russell used the idea of sense and descriptive content to make this connection between words and thoughts
with entities.
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hand, demonstratives secure reference by specific contextual conditions that have been
linked or paired with utterances such as “This is . . .” For example, when George W.
Bush stands in the South Lawn prior to the invasion of Afghanistan, he can be referenced
by saying, “This is George W. Bush.”
The referential use of proper names, however, is not as clear cut as it is with
definite descriptions and demonstratives. Even within a robust theory of reference like
HTR, it is not clear what within a proper name generates reference. Certainly the
combination of a causal-historical chain and descriptive content verifies the proper name
in use. But HTR does not qualify what linguistic mechanism within in a proper name
generates reference. In light of such obscurity, Searle investigates the referential use of
proper names to uncover what in them is generating reference.
To begin, Searle launches his inquiry on whether proper names elucidate
descriptive content with the following proposition: Suppose, for instance, that members
of the name-calling practice of George W. Bush are asked to list a set of characteristics
about the individual represented by the name. In such a situation, members of the namecalling practice would list descriptive content that intends to “uniquely” refer to George
W. Bush.34 That is because George W. Bush has been previously associated with
descriptive content that inevitably connects the name to a particular individual. When
asked, members of the name-calling practice would elucidate a “sufficient but so far
unspecific” set of characteristics that intend to refer to George W. Bush.35 Thus the

34. Searle, “Proper Names,” 171.
35. Searle, “Proper Names,” 171.
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assumption here is that the referential use of proper names presupposes the existence of
entities that satisfy a list of characteristics.
However, the primary difficulty when using the referential use of proper names is
assessing what kind of descriptive content establishes the second condition of reference.
That is, the imprecision that accompanies the referential use of proper names creates
difficulties when judging whether a set of predicates sufficiently establishes the second
condition of reference. The question thus looms as to what in a proper name elucidates
descriptive content and how does that establish reference.
To clarify what in a proper name contains descriptive content, Searle makes a
distinction between the referential functions of descriptivism and proper names with the
following proposition:36 Suppose, for example, George W. Bush came to be associated
with a detailed and exhaustive set of descriptions. For example, George W. Bush is
associated with a precise set of predicates such as ‘p1, p2 . . . pn’ where pn is a finite
number of predicates. In such instances, when George W. Bush is used, reference would
be achieved by corroborating predicates ‘p1, p2 . . . pn’ with the individual represented by
his name. George W. Bush in this sense would be associated with such a precise and rigid
set of characteristics that it could refer only at the expense of being corroborated with the
individual that satisfies predicates ‘p1, p2 . . . pn.’ In instances that the individual
represented by George W. Bush and predicates ‘p1, p2 . . . pn’ could not be corroborated,
reference is unlikely to occur. Therefore, under such parameters, a proper name that has
been associated with a detailed and exhaustive set of predicates cannot refer to an entity
that does not satisfy those characteristics.

36. Searle, “Proper Names,” 171.
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However, as a result of the association between George W. Bush and a detailed
and exhaustive set of predicates, the name appears to be an unnecessary criterion of
reference. If the proper name refers only because it is associated with a precise and rigid
set of predicates, the name serves little to no purpose for establishing reference other than
being a shorthand for elucidating predicates ‘p1, p2 . . . pn.’ As said by Searle, “the name
itself would become superfluous for it would become logically equivalent to this set of
descriptions.”37 Since George W. Bush is associated with a rigid and precise set of
predicates, the name is doing nothing unique apart from a describing function. The
consequence of this is that George W. Bush functions basically in the same way as
predicates ‘p1, p2 . . . pn,’ which makes the name a superfluous criterion. Under this
misguided conception, the referential functions of descriptivism and proper names have
been conflated in such a way that proper names do not have a unique referential function.
Proper names, however, almost never operate in such a precise and rigid way as
depicted above. Rather, in Searle’s mind, proper names allow an entity to be referenced
without elucidating a detailed and exhaustive set of characteristics (i.e., specific
predicates). He says, “the convenience of proper names [lies] precisely in the fact that
they enable us to refer publicly to objects without [coming to] agreement on what
[characteristics] exactly constitute the identity of the object.”38 Proper names in this way
do not function by descriptive exactitudes, but rather they refer because they elucidate a
sufficient and yet unspecific set of predicates held true about entities.39 This means, for

37. Searle, “Proper Names,” 171.
38. Searle, “Proper Names,” 172.
39. Searle, “Proper Names,” 173.
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instance, that even predicates like “the former governor of Texas” or “the son of George
H. W. Bush” (or some combination of these) are likely to refer to George W. Bush.
Proper names thus refer because they are logically connected to a set of predicates that
are not precise in terms of either extent or quality (i.e., generic predicates).
To clarify further, Searle goes on to describe the referential function of proper
names in terms of categorical “looseness.”40 Instead of indicating the exactitudes of an
entity’s ontological character, proper names accentuate an entity’s ontology “in a loose
sort of way.”41 When, for example, members of the name-calling practice assert George
W. Bush, the name is bound to elucidate a set of characteristics. It is unlikely, however,
that those characteristics will be detailed and exhaustive. Given the way in which proper
names function in their everyday use, predicates such as “the former governor of Texas”
or “the son of George H. W. Bush” are more likely to be elucidated than predicates such
as “the 46th governor of Texas” or “the 43rd president of the United States.” In this way,
proper names do not elucidate in accord to specific predication but rather allude by
generic predication.
With this distinction, Searle has managed to separate the referential functions of
descriptivism and proper names. Provided that proper names elucidate descriptive content
in a less detailed and exhaustive way than descriptivism, Searle has illustrated the
difference between their functions; namely, that definite descriptions refer by indicating
“what an object is” while proper names refer without ever taking “issue [with] what an

40. Searle, “Proper Names,” 173.
41. Searle, “Proper Names,” 173.
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object is.”42 As such, the difference between the referential functions of descriptivism and
proper names is primarily ontological. In terms of descriptivism, the function “refers in
virtue of the fact that the [descriptive content]” is linked or paired to an entity in a precise
and exhaustive manner. Unlike descriptivism, proper names refer because they accentuate
descriptive content in an unconditional or “loose” way.
This means that if a proper name is used and its referent is not self-evident, the
proper name can be qualified by the descriptive content elucidated during the name’s use.
For instance, when Robin Hood is asserted, the name should refer to the “heroic outlaw
in English folklore” for every person integrated into the name-calling practice. Yet at any
point that there is confusion or dispute about what individual is being referenced, the
individual can be qualified by the generic predicates elucidated during the name’s use. If
members of the name-calling practice elucidate the generic predicates such as “has a
bow,” “robs the rich,” and “feeds the poor,” then it can be assumed there is coreference
among members. However, if members of the name-calling practice accentuate radically
different predicates among one another, reference has apparently drifted.
This has obvious importance for the question at hand because it clarifies the
second condition of reference. Given that there is confusion and dispute on whether
Muslims and Christians refer to the same God, the generic predicates accentuated during
the name’s use should clarify, according to Searle, whether they meet the second
condition of reference. Because they share the same name-calling practice in situations
where they elucidate generic predicates like love, good, omnipotent, and omnipresent,
then there is adequate evidence that they refer to the same God. However, in the situation

42. Searle, “Proper Names,” 172.
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wherethey do not elucidate similar generic predicates, it is unlikely that they refer to the
same God.
Before I consider whether Muslims and Christians meet the second condition, let
us recapitulate what has been said thus far in two basic premises. The first is that proper
names presuppose the existence of entities that they intend to reference. Only in rare
situations are proper names used in ways that do not intend to refer to entities.43 It is
intuitive from this that when a proper name is used, it intends to refer to a specific entity
and not some fictional reality.44 The second and subsidiary of the first is that proper
names are almost always associated with descriptive content in a generic or loose way. In
the situation that proper names are not associated with descriptive content, then there is
no way to confirm that a proper name refers to the appropriate entity. That said, if the
former is acceptable, the latter is necessitated given that there must be a way for the
former to be confirmed. Otherwise, the basic structure of language ceases to operate and
the way in which the referential function of proper names (e.g., Nikola Jokic, George W.
Bush) and names in general (e.g., lodgepole pine, lark bunting) work is illegitimate.
Similar Set of Generic Predicates
If these premises are satisfactory, then developing a response to whether Muslims
and Christians meet the second condition of reference depends on whether they elucidate
(at least) a similar set of generic predicates that, in Searle’s language, are loose in their
original sense. Though I presume there are several ways to determine the kinds of

43. One such way would be deception. Someone might want to trick a person into believing that
there is a person with a particular name when really there is no such person.
44. Notice the word “intend.” Whether the use of a proper name actually refers is beside the point.
All that matters is that proper names almost always “intend” to refer to specific entities regardless if they
are successful doing so.

60

predicates Muslims and Christians accentuate upon the use of God, one such way is to
consider systematic theology, of which, predicates are ubiquitous. Theological claims, of
course, cannot be made without some commitment to the divine predicates (or attributes).
Statements such as “God is . . .” or “God, you are . . .” all presuppose, in various degrees,
an obligation to divine predication.45 In light of this inference, it appears reasonable that
systematic theology for Islam and Christianity can illuminate the divine predicates
common among Muslims and Christians. My presumption thus is that systematic
theology can position us to determine whether Muslims and Christians accentuate the
same or at least a similar set of generic predicates that meet the second condition of
reference.
For those familiar with systematic theology, it is obvious that a thesis such as the
current one is unable to provide a comprehensive outline and explanation of the divine
predicates upheld in Islam and Christianity, the mere scope and intricacy of which is well
beyond the capacity and applicability of this thesis. Regardless, if systematic theology for
Islam and Christianity were explained, it would be understood that Muslims and
Christians share (at least in a loose kind of way) a common set of generic predicates. To
support this inference, take how the predicate of love is attested in Islam and Christianity.
The Christian tradition, on the one hand, not only maintains that “love is from God” but
more specifically that “God is love” (1 John 4:7–8, 16). It is out of this love that creation
“might live through” God (1 John 4:9). On the other hand, the Islamic tradition in a

45. Stephen R. Holmes, “The Attributes of God,” in The Oxford Handbook of Systematic
Theology, ed. John Webster, Kathryn Tanner, and Iain Torrance (New York: University of Oxford, 2007),
54–71.
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similar way affirms that God is “the Most Loving,” from which, God “originates” and
thus sustains “the created order” (Al-Buruj 11–12).46
Moreover, later Islamic and Christian traditions expound upon what it means for
God to maintain love within the life of God. Pseudo-Dionysius, for example, connects
God’s love with God’s provisional care for the created order (i.e., providence). He says,
“[T]hey call him . . . love because he is the power moving and lifting all things up to
himself.”47 In other words, it is God’s love that provides for and sustains all created
things that ultimately prompts them to achieve their proper ends. Likewise, Al-Ghazālī
makes a connection between divine love and God’s mercy and favor bestowed upon
creation (i.e., providence). He says, “[T]he Loving-Kind is the one who wishes all
creatures well and accordingly favors them.”48 Much like the Pseudo-Dionysius, AlGhazālī maintains that God’s love underpins creation’s ability to thrive in accord with
God’s mercy and favor. Thus from a scriptural and theological perspective, God’s love
implicates provisional care for creation in Islam and Christianity.
Muslims and Christians thus agree at the very least that there is some positive
element in the life of God that is analogous to the human emotive capacity of love. Their
understandings of love illustrate the reciprocal conception that God is love and, out of
love, God provides for creation. It seems sensible thus to conclude from these inferences

46. Note that the Most Loving is one of ninety-nine beautiful names (or predicates) of God upheld
in Islam. Theologically the ninety-nine beautiful names are important in Islam because they are revealed in
the Qur’an. Thus they hold special prominence and importance in the tradition.
47. Pseudo-Dionysius, The Complete Works, ed. John Farina, trans. Colm Luibheid (New York:
Paulist Press, 1987), 47–132.
48. Al-Ghazālī. The Ninety-Nine Beautiful Names of God, 118-20.
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that Muslims and Christians have a similar conception of love (at least in a loose way) as
it relates to God.
Though this neither constitutes a systematic account of love nor of the divine
predicates in general, such examples do show how systematic theology can be used to
determine whether Muslims and Christians elucidate a common set of generic predicates.
While these inferences pertain specifically to the predicate of love, they illustrate how
one might assess whether Muslims and Christians agree on other generic predicates (e.g.,
omnipotent, omnipresent). That is, systematic theology empowers us with ability to
cross-reference generic predicates found in Islam with those in Christianity (and vice
versa), where generic predicates can be compared and contrasted in a way that one can
assess whether they share an adequate set of predicates held true about God. Systematic
theology thus is a roadmap for deciding whether Muslims and Christians meet the second
condition of reference.
Though I cannot offer a comprehensive explication of the divine predicates, my
intuition is that Muslims and Christians meet the second condition of reference because
they maintain a set of generic predicates that, in their original sense, are loose. The fact is
that Muslims and Christians uphold several generic predicates that have an equal if not
greater semblance to one another than that of divine love. For instance, Muslims and
Christians consistently maintain that God is good, creator, omnipotent, omnipresent (etc.)
that, if investigated closer, are analogous to one another. From this perspective, Muslims
and Christians appear to share and uphold a common list of generic predicates that track
with Searle’s concept of descriptive looseness. Therefore my intuition is that Muslims
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and Christians share and uphold an extensive list of generic predicates that sufficiently
establishes the second condition of reference.
If my intuition is correct and Muslims and Christians share the second condition
of reference, then in light of the first condition (i.e., causal-historical account), they refer
to the same God. Since Muslims and Christians use the same name-calling practice and
qualify its use with a common set of generic predicates (e.g., omnipotent, omnipresent), it
would be inconsistent to say they do not refer to the same God. This is demonstrated by
how we use proper names in everyday use. Suppose, for instance, that someone asserts
Robin Hood and then qualifies the use of the name with predicates such as “has a bow,”
“robs the rich,” and “feeds the poor.” Likewise, suppose someone asserts George W.
Bush and then qualifies the use of the name with predicates such as “former governor of
Texas” and “the son of George H. W. Bush.” There is little chance, under these
circumstances, that people integrated into either name-calling practice would remain
confused as to which individual is being referenced. That is, it is difficult to imagine that
people with access to a name-calling practice and the descriptive content elucidated
during the name’s use will not be able to refer to the appropriate entity.
Thus I infer that Muslims and Christian refer to the same God because they share
the same name-calling practice and elucidate a similar set of generic predicates. My
argument is that whenever Muslims and Christians share generic predicates that are loose
in their original sense, they refer to the same God given that they maintain the same
name-calling practice. So when Muslims and Christians say things like, “God is good,”
“God, you are powerful,” or “God, we need your love,” they refer to the same God. This
line of argumentation, of course, follows from the fact that reference holds between
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causal-historical account and descriptive content where the descriptive content remains
loose in its original sense. Streamlined, my argument comprises the following string of
propositions:

(1) Muslims and Christians have been properly introduced into the same namecalling practice that originated from the Abrahamic tradition (i.e., God)
and
(2) Muslims and Christians elucidate a list of generic predicates upon their
independent uses of God
thus
(3) Muslims and Christians refer to the same God.

This argument finds its foothold insofar as these propositions are maintained by Evans’
theory of reference and Searle’s theory of proper names. In other words, the claim is built
on the juxtaposition between HTR and the categorial looseness of proper names. The
argument therefore is that reference holds between a causal-historical exchange and
descriptive content where the descriptive content must only remain loose. Therefore my
argument is that Muslims and Christians refer to the same God from an Evanian-Searlian
perspective.
An initial objection to my argument is that if generic predicates are not specific
with regards to extent or quality, then there is no real ontological basis to ground an
analysis on. That is, because generic predicates are nonspecific with regard to extent and
quality, they risk falling into ontological obscurity that results in dubious metaphysical
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commitments. Thus to argue that Muslims and Christians meet the second condition of
reference is incoherent since generic predicates retain little ontological significance.
Though this is a thought-provoking objection, it fails to understand what Muslims
and Christians agree on with respect to generic predicates. It is true that generic
predicates are not specific with regards to extent or quality. However, this does not mean
that generic predicates are inept in an ontological sense. Take, for instance, when
Muslims and Christians use predicative phrases such as “God is love” or “God, you are
good.” What Muslims and Christians agree on is that there is “something” within God’s
character that is loving and good (i.e., analogical predication). That is, love and goodness
expressed in the life of God and reality have an analogous relationship with one another.
Otherwise, if predicates are inappropriate from a theological perspective, then Muslims
and Christians enter dangerous theological terrain. If it is not more adequate to use
predicates like goodness and love, then there is nothing keeping other predicates (e.g.,
evil, bad) from being used from the perspective of theology. Thus what Muslims and
Christians agree on is that there are some predicates more appropriately used of God than
others.
A different objection comes in the form of what constitutes descriptive
dominance. As stated previously, descriptive content (in light of a causal-historical chain)
establishes reference not by descriptive fit but by what is most dominant in the body of
information associated with God. On the question at hand, some have argued that Trinity
and Tawhid are, according to their own traditions, the most dominant descriptions in
God’s dossier. If this happens to be true, then Muslims and Christians cannot corefer to
the same God given that they are numerically and theologically oppositional. If accurate,
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the consequence of this objection is that Muslims and Christians do not meet the second
condition of reference; thus, my argument is incoherent.
This too is an interesting objection; however, it does not concern itself with the
complexities associated with the referential use of proper names. Recall for a moment
how proper names are used in a referential way. As previously outlined, proper names do
not refer by descriptive exactitudes. For example, people integrated into name-calling
practices do not have to accentuate a detailed and exhaustive list of predicates held true
about entities to refer to them.49 Rather, as with Robin Hood, simply elucidating things
such as “the man with the bow who robs the rich” or “the bandit who gives to the poor” is
likely to meet the second condition of reference.
If these inferences are correct as argued thus far, it seems the most dominant
descriptive content connected with proper names is whatever is normally elucidated when
a name is used. This I have argued is not precise with regards to extent or quality (i.e.,
generic predicates), given our everyday use of proper names. For example, individuals
can refer to Robin Hood (or any other entity) without knowing every particular thing held
true about him. If people had to accentuate particular things about Robin Hood (e.g., his
height, the length of his bow) to refer to him, few individuals could do so simply from an
epistemic perspective. In other words, it appears unlikely that people who casually refer
to Robin Hood have access to what is irreducible and unique to his character.

49. Though I am hesitate to uphold Searle’s conception of the referential use of proper names in
all circumstances, I cannot think of any proper names that do not follow his conception. Even in the case
where a proper name is found not to refer by generic predicates, I think there is enough evidence to say that
God in the mouth of Muslims and Christians refers in a loose way.

67

Therefore what is most dominant in the example of Robin Hood (and most other
proper names) is largely generic rather than specific predication. Though this does not
mean that specific predicates (i.e., Trinity and Tawhid) are not valuable for establishing
reference, it does mean that reference is a more complex process than this objection
lends; therefore, such an objection remains largely unfounded.
Argument 2: Different God in Worship
At this point I believe there is reasonable evidence to suggest that Muslims and
Christians corefer to the same God. However, coreference does not necessarily entail
common worship as worship relates to Muslims and Christians. I determine therefore that
reference and worship are distinct functions. Primarily a question of philosophical
theology, I seek to make this distinction in a rather ordinary manner. Rather than
developing a sophisticated response for why reference and worship are distinct functions,
I simply illustrate their dissimilarity with the following scenario:
Suppose that a Muslim and a Christian walk into a liturgical rite (or service).
Upon the opening segment, an entity represented by God is repeatedly invoked. Every
time that God is invoked, the leader predicates something of God that the community at
large holds true. As the segment progresses, predicates such as love, mercy, holy, lord,
creator, omniscient, omnipotent, and so on are all at one time or another attributed of
God.50 The first segment proceeds thus with the leader saying things such as, “God is
love,” “God is the holy One,” and “God, you are the Creator.” These sorts of predicates
continue until the end of the segment. However, as the second segment begins, the leader

50. These are not the only predicates jointly maintained within the Islamic and Christian
traditions. The fact is that there are several other predicates Muslims and Christians are likely to agree upon
in a generic way.
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adjusts the predicates she attributes to God. Rather than predicating attributes such as
love and creator, the leader predicates that God is Triune. Throughout this segment, the
leader says only things like “God is Trinity” or “God is a Triune being.” So the segment
proceeds and ends with affirmation that God is Triune.
Such a scenario fits nicely with the previous chapter and its distinction between
generic and specific predicates. Broadly speaking, the leader moves from general to more
particular claims about God as the liturgy proceeds. The leader begins with general
claims like “God is love” and “God, you are the Creator.” These, of course, mimic
generic predicates given that they do not clarify the extent or quality of God’s character
as maintained by the community at large. As the liturgy proceeds, these generic
predicates are changed to a more specific predicate (i.e., Trinity). The Triune language
mimics specific predicates insofar as the community maintains the Trinity as indictive
exclusively of God. There is thus a move in this scenario from generic predicates that are
neither irreducible nor unique to specific predicates that are.
In light of this scenario as it relates to the previous chapter, there are two
inferences that distinguish reference from worship. The first is that the Muslim and the
Christian are likely, if not theologically compelled, to affirm the leader and the predicates
attributed to God in the first segment. There is no reason either the Muslim or the
Christian would object to statements such as “God is love,” “God is the holy One,” and
“God, you are the Creator.” These predicates are maintained in the Islamic and Christian
traditions as stated in the previous chapter. The second is that the Muslim in this
particular scenario is unlikely to affirm the leader and her statements about God in the
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latter segment.51 Unlike the Christian, the Muslim is unable to affirm that God is Triune
primarily on theological grounds. Given that Tawhid is an irreducible and unique
predicate for the Muslim, there is no way that the Muslim can affirm the Triune language
without committing the most heinous of sins (i.e., shirk).52
Though there are foreseeable limitations with this scenario, these inferences
illustrate the fundamental difference between reference and worship. As argued thus far,
reference appears to function by what is neither irreducible nor unique of a given entity.
The function of reference largely entails abstract predicates held true about entities (e.g.,
Nikola Jokic is tall). As depicted in the scenario, the Muslim and the Christian meet the
appropriate conditions to refer to God since they affirm the leader and the predicates in
the former segment.
Simple affirmation of the former segment, however, does not necessarily equate
to worship. Worship entails, unlike reference, more particular and concrete predicates
held true about entities. One such reason worship entails particular and concrete
predicates is that worship illuminates the most important doctrines held true by a given
community.53 Worship is what Graham Hughes calls a “thickly woven plenitude” where
words, symbols, and movement create meaningful experiences that illuminate what a

51. Notice that this inference would also apply if the scenario were reversed, where the leader
predicates Tawhid in the second segment rather than the Trinity. Under such circumstances the Christian
would be unable to affirm that God is Tawhid in light of theological grounds.
52. Apart of Islamic religious vocabulary, shirk signifies the act of “associating” an entity with
God. Often translated as “associationism,” it can be more explicitly translated as polytheism. Though shirk
is never equated with Christians in the Qur’anic text, Christians have come to be regarded as committing
shirk in terms of their conception of Trinity. For more on this point, see D. Gimaret, “Shirk,” The
Encyclopedia of Islam: New Edition 9:484–6.
53. Bryan D. Spinks, “Worship,” in The Oxford Handbook of Systematic Theology, ed. John
Webster, Kathryn Tanner, and Iain Torrance (New York: University of Oxford, 2007), 378–93.
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community cares about.54 In relation to liturgical rites, the most important beliefs a
community holds will be logically interwoven into its ceremonial rituals (e.g., the
Eucharist, the call to prayer) and sense impressions (e.g., sight, smell). One can envision
in the previous scenario the leader undertaking the Eucharist prayer or the Rite of
Baptism during the latter segment. These rites incorporate “thick” theological words,
symbols, and movements. It is unlikely the Muslim in these scenarios would agree with
such beliefs because these rituals (and others like them) are saturated in Triune language.
In this sense, worship entails specific predicates that are built on a “thickly woven
plenitude” of ritualistic practice.
The consequence must be that Muslims and Christians refer to but do not worship
the same God. This is depicted in the previous scenario since it moves from open-ended
to more specific claims about God. Once the leader incorporates Triune language, there is
no theological basis for the Muslim to continue to agree with the leader. In this sense, it is
unlikely from the standpoint of philosophy of language that Muslims and Christians
would agree on anything beyond generic predication. Given that reference is largely
determined in relation to generic predicates, Muslims and Christians meet the conditions
for common reference in this scenario. Yet because worship incorporates a “thickly
woven plenitude” of ritualistic practice, there is no basis for common worship. Therefore,
the argument is that Muslims and Christians refer to the same God when generic
predicates are used; however, they do not worship the same God, considering that
worship entails specific predicates.

54. Graham Hughes, Worship as Meaning: A Liturgical Theology for Late Modernity (New York:
Cambridge, 2003), 30-42.
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One objection to the distinction between reference and worship is that the words,
symbols, and movements of liturgical rites often incorporate generic predicates along
with specific predicates. Though specific predicates are primary in liturgical rites, generic
predicates still remain prominent. In this sense, worship is not exclusively built on
specific predicates since generic predicates remain an important element. The objection
thus maintains that if worship comprises generic and specific predicates, then it makes
little sense why generic predicates do not meet the appropriate threshold for worship. In
other words, if Muslims and Christians agree upon a set of generic predicates, why does
this not count as common worship?
Though an interesting objection, this critique overlooks the distinction between
generic and specific predication. As articulated in the previous chapter, communal
identity is largely maintained because certain kinds of beliefs hold precedence over other
beliefs. As such, primary beliefs are maintained at the expense of adapting or negating
the less important beliefs. In light of the previous scenario, the assumption is that the
Muslim and the Christian automatically adapt generic predication to fit their particular
conceptions of specific predication. From this perspective, the Muslim and the Christian
agree only in the former segment insofar as they maintain that God is loosely associated
with generic predicates. So the objection is right insofar as generic predicates are
essential in worship; however, it misses that specific predicates hold precedence over
generic predicates. This leads to the conclusion that Muslims and Christians refer to but
do not worship the same God.
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Conclusion
In this chapter I have argued that Muslims and Christians refer to but do not
worship the same God. This argument is built on two primary premises. The first premise
is that, according to HTR, Muslims and Christians meet the two conditions that establish
reference. I demonstrated this with two arguments. On the one hand, I determined that
Muslims and Christians inherited the same original descriptive content from the
Abrahamic tradition. On the other hand, I argued that, according to systematic theology,
Muslims and Christians retain this original descriptive content in a generic way. It thus
follows from these arguments that Muslims and Christians refer to the same God because
the referential use of proper names operates by descriptive looseness (i.e., the Searlian
concept). The second premise is that common reference between Muslims and Christians
does not equate to worship. In a relatively straightforward argument, I claimed that
worship entails particular and concrete descriptions (i.e., specific predicates) while
reference entails loose description (i.e., generic predicates). Therefore, in this chapter I
demonstrated that reference primarily entails generic predication that is common among
Muslims and Christians, while worship entails specific predication, which cannot
possibly be common among Muslims and Christians.
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CHAPTER IV
CONCLUSION
Muslims and Christians Do Not Worship the Same God
In this thesis, I have sought to answer whether Muslims and Christians worship
the same God. To answer the question, I made two important distinctions in the second
chapter. The first distinction is between reference and predication. Reference primarily
holds between a linguistic or cognitive element and an entity that allows that particular
entity to be tracked, picked out, or associated with information. Unlike reference,
predication is a relation between two (or more) entities (e.g., objects, individuals,
attributes, modes) that locates these entities in their respective ontological categories.
Thus by applying philosophy of language, I established that reference and predication are
distinct and independent functions that render different linguistic outcomes.
As a subsidiary of the first, the second distinction is between generic and specific
predication, where being in (or inhering in) is characteristic of generic predication while
being said of is indicative of specific predication. In this sense, specific predicates
illustrate the type, genus, attribute, or mode that is irreducible and unique of an entity
while generic predicates express those that are more universal. The perspective here is
that specific and generic predicates elucidate entities by different ontological means that
logically configure reality in such a way that generates meaningful statements or
concepts.
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With these distinctions in mind, I argued in the third chapter that Muslims and
Christians refer to the same God. This argument rested on two basic propositions. The
first is that Muslims and Christians have been properly integrated into the same namecalling practice that originates with the Abrahamic tradition. Though I neither proposed
nor formally demonstrated this proposition, the scholarly support backing this claim is
nearly univocal. The second proposition is that Muslims and Christians share a set of
generic predicates that are dominant in the cluster of information associated with God. I
demonstrated this with two forms of argumentation. On the one front, I argued that
proper names in their everyday uses refer because they are connected to descriptive
content that is neither detailed nor exhaustive. Proper names refer because they elucidate
a sufficient and yet unspecific set of predicates held true about entities. On the other
front, I claimed that systematic theology reveals that Muslims and Christians share an
extensive list of generic predicates. When systematic accounts of Islamic and Christian
theology are compared and contrasted, they reveal that Muslims and Christians conceive
of God in a similar way in terms of generic predication. It follows from these arguments
that Muslims and Christians refer to the same God since the two conditions of HTR are
adequate for establishing reference.
Finally, though Muslims and Christians refer to the same God, I concluded that
this does not equate to worship of the same God. Because worship entails particular and
concrete predicates held true about God, it is theoretically impossible for Muslims and
Christians to worship the same God. This is true in liturgical rites where specific
predicates are thickly woven into ceremonial rites. Thus if reference does not equate to
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worship and my points leading up this conclusion have been adequately argued, then
Muslims and Christians refer to but do not worship the same God.
Intolerance and Violence
In light of my line of argumentation, I want to take up a prominent assumption
made in several circles concerning the question at hand. It has been argued that focused
attention on the philosophical and theological difference between Muslims and Christians
provokes intolerance and violence. The assumption here is that if Muslims and Christian
fail to admit that they worship the same God, then tension and hostility between them is
an inevitable consequence. Volf, for example, promotes this line of argumentation. He
says, “I . . . elevate pervasive similarities, because my primary concern is the ability of
Muslims and Christians to live a peaceful, well-ordered life in this world.”1 In this sense,
the only way for Muslims and Christians to live in peaceful harmony together is to
maintain that they worship the same God. Otherwise, they are doomed for tension and
hostility.
I anticipate that some variation of this argument will at one time or another be
used against my thesis. Though I do not think the argument is persuasive, I want to draw
attention to two flawed assumptions that undergird the argument. First, since the
methodology that underpins this argument is largely a reaction to past junctures of
intolerance and violence between Muslims and Christians, it does not make an adequate
distinction between truth claims and appropriating beliefs for different ends.2 Though
contextual circumstances are important for indicating socio-political issues, they do not

1. Volf, Allah: A Christian Response, 183.
2. The Crusades (1096-1271), War in Abkhazia (1992-93) Yugoslav War (1991-2001), etc.

76

maintain normative value when judging whether something is true. Simply said, truth
does not depend upon the particulars of context. Second, this claim is theoretically
problematic at best and false at worst because the conclusion does not follow from the
premise. The fact is that one can claim that Muslims and Christians do not worship the
same God and still remain peaceful (e.g., the current thesis). As a sort of two-part
critique, people can make truth claims that divide individuals along political, social, and
religious lines and still remain peaceful; peace does not depend upon the blurring of truth
claims so that all people stand equally before truth.
Areas for Additional Research
In this thesis, I employed philosophy of language to clarify predication and with
the intent to answer whether Muslims and Christians worship the same God. However,
there are still other avenues for developing a response to whether Muslims and Christians
worship the same God. Not only are there other subdisciplines of philosophy embedded
in the question (e.g., philosophy of mind, philosophy of religion, epistemology), there are
also alternate areas of research that should be considered (e.g., theology, history). Though
I have targeted the question from the perspective of philosophy of language with
particular interest in reference and predication, this neither embodies an all-encompassing
synthesis of the research nor a conclusive response on the question itself. It is impossible
to develop a normative response to the question at hand as long as other disciplines have
not been considered. My line of argumentation and others like it are not normative in and
of themselves on the question and require other loci. Therefore, there is growing need for
a multidisciplined response on whether Muslims and Christians worship the same God.
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An additional line of investigation is to explore what is entailed in worship.
Though I have offered judgments on this point, neither my project nor much of the
research on whether Muslims and Christians worship the same God outline the
philosophical or theological elements embedded in worship. The only guiding
assumption offered here and elsewhere is that reference necessarily precedes worship.
However, this neither clarifies what is entailed in worship nor how that should influence
one’s decision on the question. Because so little emphasis has been placed on worship as
it relates to the current question, my assumption is that further analysis of worship would
enhance this area of research.
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